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The successful management of biological populations is essential to both the world’s
economic and environmental wellbeing. This includes controlling invasive species
and sustainably harvesting biological resources for profit.
In the first chapter we consider monitoring programs for the management of
invasive populations that we wish to eradicate. Previous theoretical studies have
argued that managers are allocating too much effort to programs for determining
the location of invasive species in a managed area. In contrast, managers view early
detection as the key to invasive species management. Intuitively, the importance of
early detection makes sense because early detection can lead to early intervention
and therefore massive ecological and economic benefits. In this chapter we provide
a theoretical explanation for why it is optimal to deploy an intense initial search for
the invader and why past studies have underestimated optimal surveillance effort.
In the second chapter we consider populations that are harvested for profit.
Due to high economic and ecological stakes in determining sustainable harvest
policies for renewable resources, such as timber, fish and game, optimal harvest
is a widely studied problem in bioeconomics. However, most of the work focuses
on simple models for the harvest of unstructured populations, even though demo-
graphically structured population models are more commonly used for population
assessment. In this chapter we derive optimal escapement rules for both deter-
ministic and stochastic stage-structured population models. When considering
environmental stochasticity, optimal harvest of the pre-reproductive life stage is
either more aggressive or more conservative than in the deterministic case, depend-
ing on the second and third derivative of the recruitment function. However, when
harvesting reproductive adults, optimal harvest is the same as in the deterministic
case.
In the third chapter we ask “how much do these optimal management plans,
generated using simplified models, perform when a population is more complex?”
Can a manager use their expert judgment and flexibility to outperform simple mod-
els that make incorrect assumptions about population dynamics? As a first step
towards answering this question, we conducted experiments where human subjects
managed a hypothetical simulated population, by playing an online game, and
compared their performance to the performance of decisions developed by math-
ematical models. The models, on average, outperformed human judgment, even
when they made incorrect assumptions about the simulated population’s dynamics.
However, in some scenarios the models produced undesirable results. Therefore,
we recommend that managers use mathematical models as a supplement, rather
than a replacement, for expert judgment.
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CHAPTER 1
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
In this thesis we use optimal control theory and dynamic programming arguments
to solve problems in natural resource management, and therefore we start by briefly
introducing the reader to these topics.
1.1 Dynamic programming
Consider a dynamic decision problem of the form
min
ut∈U , t∈{0,1,...,T}
{
T∑
t=0
F (xt, ut, t) + S(xT , T )
}
subject to (1.1)
xt+1 = f(xt, ut, t),
x0 = x¯ given.
That is, we have some biological resource or pest that we wish to manage over
a length of time, T , whose state in the next time step, xt+1, is a function of
the current state, xt, and in addition the management action we chose in time
t, ut. This time dependent control, ut, takes on a value from a set of possible
management actions, U , which can be a continuous set (e.g. U = [0, 1], where ut
is the proportion of the resource we choose to remove from the system at time t)
or finite (e.g. U = {0, 1}, where ut is one if we choose to spray pesticides and zero
if we don’t). The goal for the manager is to choose ut at each time step such that
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some objective function (the value of the bracketed term in (1.1)) is minimized
(or maximized). The objective function is usually measured in economic costs or
benefits but could also include terms that factor in ecological goals that do not
have intrinsic monetary value. The scrap function (also called a “terminal cost
function” or “exit penalty”), S(xT , T ), represents the cost or benefit of leaving the
system in state xT at the end of the management period. For most of this thesis
we set it equal to zero because we consider long management windows. However,
for short term management problems, it should be included when there is large
ecological or economic rewards for leaving the system in a desirable state after
management.
When u and x can take on any value in a continuous subset of the real
numbers, we can solve (1.1) by the method of Lagrange multipliers. Here, the
difference equation in (1.1) is the constraint, and the problem can be solved by
simple multivariable calculus. We use this method to solve for optimal harvest
strategies in a stage structured fishery in Chapter 3. However, such methods do
not work for finite sets of possible management actions and it is also difficult to
extend this method to problems where the state dynamics are stochastic.
In these cases dynamic programming can be used to find a solution to (1.1).
The method is based on Richard Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1952)
which states:
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and
initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal
policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision.
This can be translated into the language of mathematics by using value functions.
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Define
V (xτ , τ) = min
ut∈U , t∈{τ,...,T}
{
T∑
t=τ
F (xt, ut, t) + S(xT , T )
}
, (1.2)
the value of the system being in state xτ in time τ . By Bellman’s Principle of
Optimality,
V (xτ , τ) = min
uτ
{F (xτ , uτ , τ) + V (xτ+1, τ + 1) } . (1.3)
From here, one can proceed iteratively, backwards in time, calculating the optimal
management decision in time τ−1, given the optimal management decision in time
τ , either by using a computer or in some special cases analytically (by recognizing
a pattern). This is known as the method of dynamic programming.
Dynamic programming can easily be extended to stochastic problems where
one wishes to maximize the expected value of the objective function, by exploiting
the properties of the expectation operator. In Chapter 3, we use this method to
solve for optimal harvest strategies for a stochastic stage structured fishery where
we are able to exploit a pattern in the value function that allows us to solve the
optimization problem analytically.
1.2 Pontryagin’s minimum principle
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we study the optimal management of invasive species
framed as a continuous time decision problem, analogous to the discrete time
problem in (1.1). That is,
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min
u(t)∈U
{∫ T
0
F (x(t), u(t), t) dt + S(x(T ), T )
}
subject to
dx
dt
= f(x(t), u(t), t),
x(0) = x0 given.
(1.4)
From here on out I will usually write x(t) and u(t) short hand as x and u, re-
spectively, to make the equations less cumbersome. Note that in this case, unlike
(1.1), the dynamics are governed by a differential equation, and the set of possible
controls, U , is a set of functions, not numbers. To solve (1.4), we use Pontryagin’s
minimum principle. A version of the minimum principle can be derived using a
dynamic programing argument. Define the value function for the above problem,
V (x, t) = min
u
{∫ T
t
F (x, u, τ) dτ + S(x(T ), T )
}
, (1.5)
To simplify our argument, we consider an unconstrained u, and assume F (x, u, t)
is not linear in u. By the Bellman principle of optimality, for some time interval
∆t, this is just
V (x, t) = min
u
{∫ t+∆t
t
F (x, u, τ) dτ + V [x(t+ ∆t), t+ ∆t]
}
. (1.6)
If we assume V is smooth, then we can Taylor expand V [x(t+ ∆t), t+ ∆t], divide
through by ∆t, cancel terms and take the limit as ∆t→ 0, to obtain
∂V (x, t)
∂t
= −min
u
{
F (x, u, t) +
∂V (x, t)
∂x
f(x, u, t)
}
, (1.7)
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known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (Bellman, 1954). This equation
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for u to be optimal. However, in
practice, solving this equation (almost always numerically) can be quite difficult
and is still an active area of research. Instead, the Pontryagin minimum principle
provides equations that form a necessary condition for u to be optimal, which are
often easier to solve.
Denote u∗ as the optimal control and x∗ as the associated optimal state
and define λ(t) ≡ ∂V (x∗, t)/∂x, the amount a manager would be willing to pay for
an infinitesimal change in the state variable, called the adjoint variable or shadow
price. Also define
H(x, u, λ, t) ≡ F (x, u, t) + λf(x, u, t), (1.8)
called the Hamiltonian. Differentiating both sides of (1.7) by x we obtain
dλ
dt
= −∂H(x
∗, u∗, λ, t)
∂x
. (1.9)
With (1.9) and the fact that x˙ = ∂H/∂λ, by the problem statement (1.4), we see
why H is called the Hamiltonian. Equation (1.9) is the main component of the
classic statement of Pontryagin Minimum Principle, which gives necessary condi-
tions for a control u(t) to be optimal. Note that the heuristic argument we gave
above requires strong assumptions on the differentiability of V . This can be relaxed
quite substantially to give the full statement of Pontryagin’s minimum principle.
Theorem 1.1 (Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle). If u∗(t) is an optimal control for
(1.4) and x∗(t) is the associated state, then there exists a piecewise differentiable
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adjoint variable λ(t) such that
H(u, x∗, λ, t) ≥ H(u∗, x∗, λ, t) (1.10)
for all controls u at each time t, and
dλ
dt
= −∂H(x
∗, u∗, λ, t)
∂x
λ(T ) =
∂S(x∗(T ), T )
∂x
.
(1.11)
We used dynamic programing to explain the intuition behind this theorem.
Alternatively, one can arrive at the minimum principle by using Lagrange multi-
pliers. This involves converting (1.4) to the analogous discrete time problem by
using a Riemann sum to approximate the objective function and a finite difference
equation to approximate the differential equation governing the state dynamics.
One then sets up the Lagrangian, takes the limit as the step size goes to zero, and
then, rather cavalierly, proceeds to perform the method of Lagrange multipliers to
derive the minimum principle above (pgs. 152-153 in Dixit, 1990).
1.3 Relation to the calculus of variations
Pontryagin’s minimum principle can be thought of as an extension of the Euler-
Lagrange equation, from the calculus of variations, to a more general class of
problems. Minimizing the functional,
∫ b
a
F (x(t), x′(t), t) dt, is a special case of
problem (1.4), where x′(t) = u(t), S(x, T ) = 0, and where u(t) is unconstrained.
In such a case, a necessary condition for u∗(t) to be optimal is that ∂H/∂u = 0
at u(t) = u∗(t), for all t. Differentiating the Hamiltonian by u, solving for λ and
then differentiating by t yields
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dλ
dt
= − d
dt
[
∂F
∂u
]
, (1.12)
Which we can combine with (1.11) to get the Euler-Lagrange equation
∂F
∂x
− d
dt
[
∂F
∂u
]
= 0. (1.13)
We chose to use dynamic programing to give a heuristic argument for the
Pontryagin Minimum Principle, as we will use dynamic programming in Chapter
3 of this thesis. However, we could have used a calculus of variations argument to
derive a version of Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle. To do so, we would start by
assuming u∗(t) is optimal, define an  perturbation u(t) = u∗(t)+  h(t), and show
that (1.8) and (1.11) imply the derivative of the objective functional evaluated at
u, with respect to , is zero at the point where  = 0, as outlined in (pgs. 7-12 in
Lenhart and Workman, 2007).
1.4 Summary
In this chapter we gave an overview of the optimization methods we use to solve
natural resource management problems by introducing the reader to the concepts of
dynamic programming, Lagrange multipliers, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion, Pontryagin’s minimum principle and the calculus of variations. Note that
we have sacrificed mathematical rigor in order to intuitively see the connections
between all of these mathematical tools. For the full 33 page, rigorous, proof of
the Pontryagin minimum principle see (Pontryagin, 1987)
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMAL SURVEILLANCE FOR INVASIVE SPECIES
MANAGEMENT
Abstract
Government agencies develop invasive species management programs assuming
that early detection is key to successful management. However, theoretical stud-
ies have suggested that managers are investing too heavily in sampling to detect
new local invader populations. This is a paradox; how can early detection seem
so important when theory suggests otherwise? Using optimal control theory to
develop surveillance policies that minimize the total cost of sampling, eradication,
and damage by the invasive, we find that the best strategies use intense early sam-
pling, followed by reduced sampling effort. In contrast, past theoretical work has
mostly been restricted to constant sampling effort strategies, potentially under-
playing the importance of surveillance. Intense early sampling drastically reduces
costs compared to the best constant effort strategies if propagule pressure from
outside the managed area is low. However, when new infestations tend to result
from independent introductions, instead of local spread that a manager can prevent
through detection and eradication, intense early sampling provides minimal cost
savings over the constant strategies calculated in the literature. Invasive species
with low introduction rates, such as Anoplophora glabripennis (Asian longhorned
beetle), warrant an initial period of intense surveillance. This is especially true
if the invader spreads quickly, such as many invaders of fresh water lakes. How-
ever, for managers sampling to eradicate isolated Lymantria dispar (gypsy moth)
populations on the west coast of the US, constant-effort sampling will be cost ef-
fective because of the high propagule pressure from established populations in the
Northeast US.
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2.1 Introduction
Invasive species cause hundreds of billions of dollars of damage to urban
infrastructure, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and natural ecosystems (Pimentel
et al., 2005; Davis, 2009). There is a rich literature describing the optimal man-
agement of established invasive species under complete knowledge of population
abundance (see Epanchin-Niell and Hastings (2010) for a review). However, only
recently has the focus of optimal invasive species management shifted towards the
design of surveillance programs for invasive species whose distribution is uncertain
(Mehta et al., 2007; Bogich et al., 2008; Hauser and McCarthy, 2009; Haight and
Polasky, 2010; Homans and Horie, 2011; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012; Horie et al.,
2013; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2014; Rout et al., 2014).
These theoretical optimal monitoring programs clash with management in-
tuition. Biologists and managers widely recognize that intense monitoring and
early detection are key components of successful invasive species management
(Hobbs and Humphries, 1995). In fact, “early detection and rapid response” is
one of five main sections of the United States’ official National Invasive Species
Management Plan (National Invasive Species Council, 2008). However, when the-
oretical optimal monitoring strategies have been compared to what managers actu-
ally do in the field, nearly all suggest that managers are sampling too much (Bogich
et al., 2008; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012). For example, using data on Gypsy Moth
in Washington, Bogich et al. (2008) found that managers were deploying traps at
densities approximately 20 times greater than the “optimal” solution. Is nearly 95
percent of the sampling deployed in Washington really a waste of money? And if
so, how general are these results?
Due to model and methodological simplifications, previous theoretical stud-
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ies have largely explored surveillance strategies that are static in time by either
(1) calculating the most cost effective time constant sampling strategy (Mehta
et al., 2007; Bogich et al., 2008; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2014), (2) solving for op-
timal sampling effort assuming the pest is at an economic equilibrium density
(Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012), or (3) focusing on surveillance at a single moment in
time (Hauser and McCarthy, 2009; Horie et al., 2013; Rout et al., 2014). However,
because early detection can lead to early intervention, we might expect optimal
sampling effort to be more intense early during a management program. If this is
the case, theory could be vastly underestimating optimal sampling effort.
In this paper we generate rules of thumb for when intense initial sampling,
followed by a sharp decrease in sampling effort, is more cost effective than strategies
that are constant through time. For invaders with high rates of establishment from
an outside source, the constant strategies in the literature are likely cost effective
and managers may be sampling too much. However, if the invader spreads much
faster than the rate at which it is being introduced from an outside source, con-
stant sampling strategies underestimate optimal sampling effort early during the
management program. When the local spread of the invasive is fast and propagule
pressure is low, intense efforts for early detection are, in fact, key to cost effective
management.
When classifying invasions into the categories of high and low introduction
rates, it is important to consider the spatial scale of management. At a national
scale, long distance or human mediated dispersal may be considered local spread,
while for a farm, park or city such dispersal may be part of the introduction rate.
Therefore, even if constant strategies are cost effective for managing a pest in one
situation, a manager controlling the same species in another situation may need
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to increase sampling early in order to minimize total costs.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Ecological model
Resolving the strong disagreement between mathematical results and biological in-
tuition on the importance of sampling is vital for designing cost effective manage-
ment programs for biological invasions. Therefore, we developed a general model,
ignoring details that vary among organisms. The core of the sampling problem is
the following trade-off: when the invader is rare, it is costly to find, but relatively
cheap to control. When the invader is abundant, it is easy to find, but costly to
control. Using this trade-off, our model captures the essence of invasive population
dynamics and management to propose clear rules of thumb for when intense early
sampling is important.
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Figure 2.1: A flow diagram for the ecological model
Our model (see Fig. 2.1) considers a landscape of infinitely many patches.
In each patch, the invasive may be absent, present but undetected, detected, or
present at such high densities that no sampling is required to detect it; we call
a patch in the last state an Outbreak. The state variables, A(t), U(t), D(t), and
O(t), are the proportion of patches in the Absent, Undetected, Detected and Out-
break states at time t, respectively. In the absence of control, Undetected and
Detected patches transition into Outbreaks due to growth of the invasive popula-
tion. We rescale the model so that one time unit is the average time it takes for
an Undetected or Detected patch to transition into an Outbreak. We assume Out-
break patches infect Absent patches at rate γA(t)O(t), via the law of mass action.
Therefore, γ is the local spread rate, defined as the average number of patches
infected by a single outbreak, over the average lifespan of an Undetected patch,
when nearly all other patches are Absent. Absent patches can also be infected by
an outside source at a constant rate α. The presence of invasives in Undetected
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patches is detected via sampling at rate ess(t), where es is sampling efficacy and
s(t) is the per-patch sampling effort deployed in Absent and Undetected patches
at time t. Detected patches are eradicated at rate ed. Outbreak patches are also
eradicated, but at a slower rate, eo, since eradicating large populations is often
very difficult. These assumptions yield:
dA
dt
= eoO + edD − αA− γOA
dU
dt
= αA+ γOA− ess(t)U − U
dD
dt
= ess(t)U − edD −D
dO
dt
= U +D − eoO.
(2.1)
2.2.2 Economic model
The assumed goal for the manager is to choose sampling effort, s(t), over a time
interval of length T , to minimize the total cost of the invasion, including the costs
of damage by the invader, sampling and control. We assume smax is the maximum
amount of sampling effort a manager can deploy at any given time. Let ku be
the cost of the invader’s damage in an Undetected patch, and ko, and kd be the
sum of the costs of the invasive’s damage and the the manager’s eradication effort
in Outbreak and Detected patches, respectively. Let f(s) be the per-patch cost
of deploying s units of sampling effort. All future costs are discounted at rate δ,
meaning one dollar now is worth e−δt dollars t time units in the future (δ can be
thought of as an interest rate). Therefore, the total discounted cost of the invasion,
per-patch, is
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J =
∫ T
0
e−δt [ kuU + koO + kdD + f(s)(A+ U) ] dt. (2.2)
We assume f(s) = kss+s
2. If  = 0, ks is just the per unit cost of sampling.
If  is small, then the cost of sampling is approximately linear, until sampling effort
reaches such high levels that the scarcity of supplies or labor drives up per-effort
costs. In most cases  would be much smaller than ks so that the quadratic term is
negligible for sampling rates a manager typically deploys in the field. However, for
sampling programs that require skilled labor or specialized equipment,  could be
considerably greater than zero due the diminishing supply and increasing demand
for qualified employees. The inclusion of the quadratic term is also mathematically
convenient, as it guarantees the existence of an optimal solution.
To find the sampling strategy through time, s(t), that minimizes the cost
of the invasion, J , we use optimal control theory (Lenhart and Workman, 2007).
Optimal control theory is a set of methods for determining the best action to take
at each moment in time, in a way that minimizes total costs, which include the
cost of taking an action, the cost of the system state changing in response to that
action, and the cost of future actions that must be taken due to the resulting
system state (see section 5.1 for the full mathematical analysis).
2.2.3 Possible sampling strategies
Two types of constant strategies have been used to develop surveillance plans in
the literature, optimal constant sampling and optimal equilibrium sampling, and
so we compare the costs of deploying these strategies to the optimal time varying
sampling strategy, s(t). We define optimal constant sampling as the most cost
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effective sampling effort, if sampling effort is not allowed to change in time (i.e.
the value of s that minimizes J if s(t) ≡ s).
For any constant sampling effort s(t) ≡ s, the proportion of patches in each
state will approach and remain at an equilibrium depending on s. We call the
value of s that minimizes the total cost of maintaining this equilibrium optimal
equilibrium sampling and we refer to the corresponding proportion of Undetected
and Outbreak patches as the optimal equilibrium. The optimal equilibrium is non-
zero (i.e., the invasive is not completely eliminated). Because sampling is less and
less cost effective when the pest is rare, complete elimination is not economically
optimal.
Since the optimal equilibrium strategy is a specific type of constant strategy,
optimal equilibrium sampling will always be at least as costly as optimal constant
sampling. For most of our analysis we will compare the optimal time varying
strategy to the optimal constant strategy, and not the equilibrium strategy, since
any observed difference in costs would only be magnified by comparing our strategy
to equilibrium sampling. However, equilibrium sampling is important, not only
because past studies have recommended management based on this calculation
but also because it will help us describe the optimal time varying sampling policy.
2.2.4 Parameterization
As an illustrative example we consider the management of gypsy moth, Lyman-
tria dispar, an invasive forest pest in the United States that has spread across the
northeast. Gypsy moth causes massive defoliation, resulting in economic damage
due to tree mortality and also the decline of native insect and bird populations
15
(Thurber et al., 1994; Redman and Scriber, 2000). It is not well established on
the west coast, and Washington, Oregon and California spend millions of dollars
per year sampling to detect and eradicate isolated populations. We used data
from the Washington State gypsy moth eradication program and the largest suc-
cessful eradication in the United States, in Lane County Oregon, to estimate es,
ks, ko, ku, eo and kd, as displayed in table 2.1. See section 5.2 for details on the
parameterization. Note, our general model should not be used to develop specific
management strategies for gypsy moth in the field, as it is too simple to provide
specific protocols. However, gypsy moth provides us a baseline parameterization,
grounded in reality, and we use this parameterization to demonstrate when intense
early sampling is most important for cost effective invasive species management,
and especially how these differences are magnified by changes in the cost and ef-
fectiveness of management and how the invader spreads.
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Table 2.1: variables and parameters
Symbol Description L. dispar
baseline
Parameter
ranges tested
A(t) proportion of patches where the invader is
absent at time t
- -
U(t) proportion of patches where the invader is
present but undetected at time t
- -
O(t) proportion of Outbreak patches at time t -
s(t) per-patch sampling effort in Absent and
Undetected patches at time t
- -
smax maximum possible sampling effort 3960 traps 150-5000
γ rate at which Outbreaks infect new patches varies 0 - 10
α rate at which absent patches are colonized
from an outside source
varies 0 - 0.1
es the rate at witch a trap detects an Unde-
tected patch
0.56 0.01 - 1
eo the rate at witch Outbreaks are eradicated 3.25 0.1 - 6
ed the rate at witch Detected patches are
eradicated
13 6 - 156
ku cost of damage per undetected patch per
unit time
30.3 thousand
USD · patch−1
0 - 400,000 USD
ko cost of damage and control per Outbreak
patch per unit time
88.8 million
USD · patch−1
2,000 - 200 mil
USD
kd cost of damage and control per Detected
patch per unit time
582.5 thousand
USD · patch−1
50,000 - 800,000
USD
ks cost per unit of sampling effort 646 USD ·
trap−1· patch−1
50 - 2,000 USD
T length of time the invasive is being man-
aged
5 (i.e. 65 years) 5
 weighting of quadratic sampling cost 0.01 0 - 25
δ discount rate 0.13 0 - 1
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2.3 Results
The optimal strategy, regardless of the parameters, is to initially sample
such that the population is quickly driven to the optimal equilibrium, then sample
at a constant rate to maintain this equilibrium pest density, ultimately ceasing
to sample as the end of the management period approaches (see Fig. 2.2a for a
typical example). Ceasing to sample near the end occurs because a manager in the
model has to pay costs for sampling but does not get the benefit from the resulting
prevention of the invasive’s spread and damage after time T . This is an artifact of
finite-time control problems and we ignore it for the rest of this paper.
In most situations the initial approach towards equilibrium is characterized
by intense early sampling, followed by a drastic reduction in sampling effort (see
Fig. 2.2a, black solid curve, for a typical strategy, and Fig. 2.2bc for the corre-
sponding population dynamics). However, the initial sampling intensity and the
amount of money saved by deploying such “early detection” strategies, depends
on four main factors: (1) the rate at which the invasive spreads within the man-
aged area, (2) the cost of outbreaks and sampling, (3) the efficacy of sampling and
eradicating outbreaks, and (4) the initial frequencies of Undetected and Outbreak
patches.
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Figure 2.2: (a) Per-patch sampling effort as a function of time for, the time vary-
ing strategy (solid black), the equilibrium strategy (dashed red), and the best
constant strategy (dot dashed blue). (b) The corresponding dynamics of the
proportion of Undetected patches and (c) Outbreaks. (d) The total per-patch
cost, in USD, of deploying the optimal intense early sampling strategy, the best
constant strategy and the optimal equilibrium sampling strategy. One time unit
is 13 years, corresponding to a 65 year management window. Parameters are
α = 0.0001, γ = 2, smax = 1980, the rest as in Table 2.1.
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Spread: Fixing all parameters to the values estimated for gypsy moth, but varying
both α, the introduction rate, and γ, the local spread rate, we find that intensive
early sampling is important if established local populations spread the invasive
much more frequently than it is arriving from an outside source (high γ and low
α, see Fig 2.3ab compared to Fig 2.3cd). Intense early sampling pays off because
it prevents Undetected patches from transitioning into Outbreaks, which are the
primary source of new infections when introductions from an outside source are
infrequent. In this case high initial sampling can save a manager over 40% of the
total invasion cost compared to a manager using optimal constant sampling (Fig.
2.3a).
While the total cost savings of using intense early sampling is bigger for
large local spread rates (compare the total difference between the black and gray
bars in Fig. 2.3a to the difference in Fig. 2.3b), proportionally the cost benefit
decreases. This is because increasing the local spread rate increases the total cost
under both strategies much more than it increases the cost savings from early
detection.
We note that with a slow introduction rate the total savings is similar re-
gardless of how quickly the manager is able to eradicate detected patches (compare
the the absolute difference in the heights of the black and gray bars on the right
to the difference on the left in Fig. 2.3ab). However, because the total cost of
management is highest for when eradication is slow, the proportional cost savings
is lower in this case. When the eradication of detected patches is fast there is both
a large proportional and total cost savings.
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Figure 2.3: Per patch cost of the best constant sampling (black bar) and intense
early sampling (gray bar) strategies, for (a) low introduction and local spread rates,
(b) low introduction and high local spread rates, (c) high introduction, and low
local spread rates and (d) high introduction and local spread rates. (a-d) The bars
on the left are for slow management, an average Detected patch eradication delay
of one year and the bars on the right are for fast management, a four month delay.
Note that in (b) and (d) the cost axis does not start at zero. Other parameters
are in Table 2.1.
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If new local infestations are the result of frequent introductions from an
outside source (high α and low γ) then constant sampling strategies can be al-
most as cost effective as intense early sampling protocols (see Fig. 2.3cd). In this
case sampling and eradication prevent the manager from accruing the added cost
of Undetected patches turning into outbreaks, but they do not significantly con-
tribute to preventing new infestations, since most newly colonized patches result
from introductions that are out of the manager’s control.
Costs: There are four costs in our model, but the cost of sampling and the cost of
Outbreak patches are the most crucial for determining when intense early sampling
strategies greatly reduce the total cost of an invasion. When fixing the parame-
ters ed, es, and eo to match the baseline values for gypsy moth management and
randomly varying all four cost parameters simultaneously using Latin Hypercube
Sampling (McKay et al. (1979), see Table 2.1 for parameter ranges), nearly all the
variation in the relative cost of deploying constant versus intense early sampling
is explained by the sampling and Outbreak costs, ks and ko (Fig. 2.4ab). The
cost of damage in Undetected patches and the cost of managing small detected
populations is relatively unimportant (see Fig. 5.1ab on pg. 115).
When a unit of sampling effort is nearly as costly as managing an Outbreak,
the manager should not sample at all in both the time varying and constant case.
Also, if the cost of a single unit of sampling is close to zero, sampling rates are high
for the constant strategy and hence nearly match intense early sampling protocols.
Therefore, only for a wide range of intermediate, sampling to Outbreak cost ratios,
is there great proportional benefits to using intense early sampling (Fig. 2.4b).
In the gypsy moth parameterization, if we assume low introduction rates,
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there is a wide range of sampling to Outbreak cost ratios, spanning multiple orders
of magnitude, for which there is at least a 15 percent reduction in costs when using
intense early sampling strategy (Figs. 2.4b, and 5.1c on pg. 115). For example,
with a trap cost of 50 USD, early sampling is important for Outbreak costs ranging
between 50 thousand to five billion USD per year. Note that the cost of sampling
and the cost of managing outbreaks, based on values reported in the literature, are
at levels that come close to maximizing the importance of early sampling, as long
as the gypsy moth introduction rate from an outside source is low (red line in Fig.
2.4b).
Discounting future costs always reduces optimal sampling because the cost
of sampling is immediate, but the benefits of sampling accumulate in the future.
Therefore, it is not surprising that high discount rates reduce the importance of
early sampling (Fig. 2.4c).
Increasing  magnifies the quadratic cost, making sampling most expensive
when sampling effort is already high. This reduces the importance of intense early
sampling, but the effect is small unless  is large enough to have a have a major
effect on costs even when sampling effort is substantially below smax (Fig. 2.4d).
Efficacy of sampling and eradication of Outbreaks: The importance of early
sampling is maintained for a wide range of sampling efficacies (Fig. 2.4e).
The outbreak eradication rate can also affect the importance of early sam-
pling (Fig. 2.4f). In terms of total cost savings, if eradicating outbreaks is slow, it
is especially important to sample early. However, the ratio of the cost of using a
constant strategy to the cost using an early sampling strategy, increases with the
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Figure 2.4: (a) The total cost savings of deploying the intense early sampling
strategy instead of the constant strategy as a function of the product of sampling
and Outbreak management costs. (b) Relative cost of the constant sampling and
intense early sampling strategies, as a function of the ratio of sampling cost to
Outbreak cost. The red line corresponds to the baseline values in table 2.1. For
(ab) we varied all cost parameters via Latin Hypercube Sampling. (c) The total
per-patch cost of deploying the constant strategy (blue filled circles) and the intense
early sampling strategy (open black circles) as a function of the discount rate, δ
(c), quadratic cost penalty,  (d), and sampling efficacy, es (e), and the Outbreak
eradication rate, eo (f). Parameters are α = 0.0005, γ = 2, and the rest as in table
2.1.
increased Outbreak eradication rate (Fig. 2.4f).
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When intense early sampling isn’t optimal: Early detection strategies will
be more cost effective than constant strategies unless the initial proportion of
Undetected and Outbreak patches is below the optimal equilibrium. Theoretically,
in such cases, the manager waits until their is a critical density of Undetected
patches before deploying any sampling effort (see Fig. 5.2ab on pg. 116).
This case is likely rare because, for the majority of reasonable parameter
values, the optimal equilibrium is very close to zero Undetected and Outbreak
patches. Therefore, as long as the invasive is known to exist somewhere in the
managed area, it is optimal to sample heavily in the beginning of the management
period. The only time this is not the case is if sampling is so ineffective that high
sampling effort does not reduce the population to low levels (Fig. 5.2c on pg. 116).
In this case, either no sampling is ever deployed or the equilibrium proportion of
infected patches is so high that the approach towards equilibrium is characterized
by zero initial sampling, followed by a gradual increase in sampling effort as the
pest becomes abundant (Fig. 5.2c on pg. 116).
Unknown initial frequency of the invasive: When a manager first starts to
develop sampling protocols, the extent of the invasion is usually unknown. There
are two likely scenarios (1) there is reason to believe an invader is present but it
has not been detected or (2) an Outbreak has been reported but it is unclear if this
is an isolated population or it has already infected other patches. In case one, even
if the invasive is present with small probability, early detection strategies can still
perform better, on average, than constant strategies. For example, suppose that
a manager (correctly) estimates that there is probability p of the invasive being
present in three out of 200 patches in the managed area, and otherwise the invasive
25
is completely absent. Given the cost parameters from the gypsy moth example and
with γ = 2 and α = 0.0005, even if p is as low as 0.2 it is still better to deploy
intense sampling effort early than to sample at the constant or equilibrium rate
(Fig. 2.5a).
In case (2), where an outbreak is detected but the number of Undetected
patches is unknown, intense early sampling can be beneficial, even when there are
no other infected patches to start with. For example, consider a landscape with ini-
tially one Outbreak out of 200 patches. In addition it has three Undetected patches
with probability p and no Undetected patches with probability 1 − p. Given the
cost parameters from the gypsy moth example and with γ = 2 and α = 0.0005,
even if p = 0, it is still more cost effective to deploy intense early sampling effort
than it is to sample at the best constant rate (Fig. 2.5b). The reason for this
is that with an Outbreak patch initially present, even though the intense early
sampling strategy overspends when no Undetected patches are initially present, it
is able to prevent a large initial buildup of Undetected patches that spread from
the Outbreak before successful Outbreak eradication (Fig. 2.5c).
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Figure 2.5: (a) The expected per-patch cost of management, assuming the land-
scape is initially 1.5% Undetected patches with probability p and completely absent
of the invader with probability 1 − p, under the optimal equilibrium (dashed red
line), the best constant (dot-dashed blue line), and the intense early sampling
(black solid line) strategy, as a function of p. (b) The expected per-patch cost of
management assuming an initial landscape with 0.5% Outbreaks and additionally,
with probability p, 1.5% Undetected patches, as function of p. (c) The correspond-
ing Undetected patch dynamics as a function of time when there is initially 0.5
% Outbreaks and no Undetected patches under the best constant strategy (dash-
dotted blue line) and the intense early sampling strategy (solid black line). The
parameters are γ = 2, α = 0.0001, and the rest as in 2.1.
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2.4 Discussion
In this paper we showed that intense early sampling protocols are key to cost effec-
tive management for invasive species with low introduction rates and high spread
rates. However, when introduction from an outside source dominates local spread,
the best constant effort strategies perform near optimally. Note we are not say-
ing that sampling effort should be low when introduction rates are high. When
introduction rates are high, sampling effort should be high during the entire man-
agement program, but there is less of a cost benefit of increasing initial sampling
effort over the optimal constant level.
When a manager is considering carrying out an intense initial search for the
invader, on top of the constant sampling she already plans to do, she should ask
the following question: “If I find a new infestation, is it more likely that this new
population is the result of spread from somewhere else in my management area,
or is it more likely the result of an independent introduction?”
In many cases, an invasion results from infrequent introduction events. For
example, it is hypothesized that the entire gypsy moth invasion can be traced back
to a single person accidentally releasing them from his residence in Massachusetts
in 1869. At the moment when these moths were first reported to be a nuisance,
the introduction rate was probably close to zero, and therefore intense early sam-
pling would have been desirable. Unfortunately, a management program wasn’t
enacted until more than twenty years after this introduction. The Anoplophora
glabripennis, Asian longhorned beetle, invasion at the country scale, is another
example that might benefit from intense early sampling, since its introduction rate
into several countries is very low (see table 2 of Haack et al. (2010)).
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The management of species that invade fresh water systems may also benefit
from intense early sampling because local spread within a lake or network of lakes,
due to boat traffic and natural currents, can be much faster than the introduction
and establishment rate from an outside source. For example, Hydrilla verticillata,
is an invasive aquatic weed in the US that can quickly reproduce and spread
via stolons, seeds, fragmentation and turions (Langeland, 1996). Once a small
outbreak has been detected within a lake, the remaining habitable area within the
lake should be sampled intensely.
The spatial scale at which the invasive is being managed should be con-
sidered when deciding whether intense early sampling is important. For the man-
agement of an invasive species at a national or global scale, the introduction rate
may only incorporate infrequent spread through international transportation and
trade. However, a manager in charge of a state, county, city, national park or farm
will incorporate spread that would be considered “local” at a national scale into
the introduction rate. Introductions include spread from populations the manager
cannot control and the local spread rate includes dispersal between populations
the manager can eradicate.
The issue of spatial scale means that intense early sampling strategies will
not be crucial to reduce costs for all invasive species. In the case of gypsy moth
management in the mid west and on the west coast of the United States, the
introduction rate from the east coast is very high due to frequent, loosely regulated
travel within the country. So our case study confirms that restrictions in past gypsy
moth models to constant strategies (Sharov and Liebhold, 1998; Bogich et al., 2008;
Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012) should produce reasonably cost efficient sampling rates.
Since these sampling rates are much lower than what is deployed in Washington
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(Bogich et al., 2008), it is possible that Washington’s managers are sampling too
intensely.
In California, Epanchin-Niell et al. (2012) found that the best equilibrium
sampling effort closely matched the statewide trap densities deployed in 2010.
However, such strategies still recommend 42 percent less sampling than Califor-
nia’s historic average trap density prior to 2008 (Bogich et al., 2008). While there
are many potential explanations for this, including random chance or reduced op-
erating budgets, another possibility is that California has been decreasing sampling
effort over time, towards optimal equilibrium sampling, which our model suggests
is optimal.
Scientists are now recommending that natural resource management agen-
cies develop surveillance programs guided by optimal constant sampling strategies
(Epanchin-Niell et al., 2014). While such optimization models add objectivity and
potentially improved outcomes, we caution that such strategies can be cost ineffi-
cient compared to intense early sampling. Since it is often intractable to do time
dependent optimization on complicated models used for real world management
problems, it might be beneficial to augment constant sampling effort, resulting
from static optimization methods, with an intense pulse of early sampling.
Along with previous work on the optimal surveillance of invasive species
(Mehta et al., 2007; Bogich et al., 2008; Hauser and McCarthy, 2009; Haight and
Polasky, 2010; Homans and Horie, 2011; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012; Horie et al.,
2013; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2014; Rout et al., 2014), we emphasize weighing the
trade-offs between the cost of sampling and future costs resulting from damages and
more expensive management actions. For any invasive species, it will be less costly
to manage a small population than an outbreak. However, previous mathematical
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work has underplayed the importance of early sampling and therefore undervalued
the utility of extensive search in cases where new infestations are caused mostly
by local spread. The benefits of intense early sampling in such situations can help
explain why managers tend to sample more than what past studies have suggested
is optimal and why government agencies list “early detection” as one of the key
components of invasive species management.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL ESCAPEMENT FOR STAGE STRUCTURED
FISHERIES WITH ENVIRONMENTAL STOCHASTICITY
Abstract
Stage structured population models are commonly used to understand fish pop-
ulation dynamics and additionally for stock assessment. Unfortunately, there is
little theory on the optimal harvest of stage structured populations, especially in
the presence of stochastic fluctuations. In this paper, we find closed form optimal
equilibrium escapement policies for a three dimensional, discrete time, stage struc-
tured population model with linear growth, post-harvest nonlinear recruitment,
and stage specific pricing and extend the analytic results to structured popula-
tions with environmental stochasticity. When only fishing reproductive adults,
stochasticity does not affect optimal escapement policies. However, when harvest-
ing immature fish, the addition of stochasticity can increase or decrease optimal
escapement depending on the second and third derivative of the recruitment func-
tion. For logistic recruitment, stochasticity reduces optimal immature escapement
by a multiplicative factor of one over one plus the variance of the environmen-
tal noise. Using hard clam, Mercenaria mercenaria, as an example and assuming
Beverton-Holt recruitment, we show that optimal fishing of hard clam targets the
immature stage class exclusively and that environmental stochasticity should in-
crease optimal escapement.
3.1 Introduction
Fisheries biologists, managers and economists widely recognize that traditional one
dimensional bioeconomic models are too simple for developing management guide-
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lines for the majority of real-life fisheries (Clark, 2010), as policies derived from
such models can drastically reduce profits and stock sizes when naively applied to
age structured populations (Tahvonen, 2008). While determining optimal age spe-
cific harvest policies is a classic problem in bioeconomics (Clark et al., 1973; Bed-
dington and Taylor, 1973; Rorres and Fair, 1975; Reed, 1980; Getz, 1980; Gurtin
and Murphy, 1981), and an active area of both theoretical and applied research
(Tahvonen, 2009; Diekert et al., 2010; Skonhoft et al., 2012; Da Rocha et al., 2013;
Tahvonen et al., 2013; Kanik and Kucuksenel, 2013; Quaas et al., 2013; Skonhoft
and Gong, 2014), the effect of stage structure and environmental stochasticity on
optimal fisheries management is poorly understood.
Stage-structured models are often used to understand fish population dy-
namics and perform stock assessment (Liu et al., 2002; Swain et al., 2009). It is
usualy more convenient for managers to obtain data on fish size or life stage rather
than age. Techniques for aging organisms can be expensive and time consuming
and in extreme cases logistically infeasible (Bergh and Johnston, 1992). In addi-
tion, fish prices are often based on discrete size classes or life stages (Reddy et al.,
2013; Bricelj et al., 1980). While developing optimal harvest rules for size and
stage structured populations can potentially improve fisheries management, it is
more challenging to solve for optimal strategies in this framework due to the lack
of sparsity in the equations for stock dynamics.
Past studies have simplified the problem by limiting transitions between
stage classes (Getz and Haight, 1989; Tahvonen, 2014) or using continuous time
models, including two dimensional ordinary differential equations (e.g. (Jing and
Ke, 2004)) and partial differential equations (Botsford, 1981; Busoni and Matucci,
1997). However, fisheries biologists usually use discrete time models for stock
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assessment (Deriso, 1999) and variability between individuals within a population
can lead to a wide range of stage transitions, previously unexplored with respect
to optimization.
Tahoven’s model Tahvonen (2014) is the most similar to our deterministic
setup, but differs in a few key ways. We assume that harvest occurs prior to
growth and recruitment, as is usually the case for migrating fish populations such
as eel and salmon (De Leo and Gatto, 2001; Nickelson and Lawson, 1998) and
that individuals can skip stages. However, the biggest difference between our two
approaches is that we consider the addition of environmental stochasticity.
While the effect of environmental stochasticity on optimal harvest has been
widely studied for one dimensional bioeconomic models (e.g. (Reed, 1979)), little
is known about how stochasticity affects optimal harvest in structured popula-
tions. Of the few studies that exist, stochasticity is typically only included in
the form of random recruitment, and usually independent of spawning biomass
(Getz and Haight, 1989; Da Rocha et al., 2013). In addition, solutions heavily rely
on numerical simulation and error-bound approximation (Getz and Haight, 1989;
Mendelssohn, 1978).
In this paper, to our knowledge, we provide the first analytic optimal con-
stant stationary escapement solution for a demographically structured population
model with endogenous, nonlinear recruitment and environmental stochasticity af-
fecting all classes. We find that with the addition of environmental stochasticity,
the optimal escapement of reproductive adults remains unchanged from the de-
terministic case, if harvest occurs prior to recruitment. However, in the case of
immature harvest, fishing should either be more aggressive or conservative than the
deterministic case depending on the second and third derivatives of the recruit-
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ment function. For example, if the recruitment function is logistic, escapement
should decrease by a factor of one over one plus the variance of the environmental
noise. We use historical data from New York state’s hard clam fishery to provide
a concrete example of our theoretical results.
3.2 The deterministic model
Consider a harvested fish population, with stage or size structured dynamics,
B1,t+1 = R(B3,t − ht) + a11B1,t
B2,t+1 = a21B1,t + a22(B2,t − ηt)
B3,t+1 = a31B1,t + a32(B2,t − ηt) + a33(B3,t − ht),
(3.1)
where B1,t, B2,t, and B3,t are the biomass of juvenile (stage 1), immature (stage
2) and adult (stage 3) fish at time t, respectively. The Juvenile stage consists of
fish too small to reproduce or catch. The immature stage consists of all fish large
enough to catch but still cannot reproduce. At time t, ht and ηt units of biomass
are harvested from the adult and immature fish population. The remaining fish
survive and grow, where aij is the average amount of biomass gained in stage i, at
time t + 1, per unit of biomass that escaped harvest in stage j at time t. Adults
that escape harvest, reproduce, generating offspring with total biomass described
by a bounded, positive, concave, density dependent recruitment function R(σt),
where σt = B3,t − ht is the spawning biomass at time t and R(0) = 0. We can
write the model in matrix notation as
Bˆt+1 = A(Bˆt − hˆt) + Rˆt (3.2)
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where
Bˆt =

B1,t
B2,t
B3,t
 , A =

a11 0 0
a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
 , hˆ =

0
ηt
ht
 , Rˆt =

R(B3,t − ht)
0
0
 ,
We wish to optimize total discounted revenue, where revenue is a linear
function of harvest,
max
ht,ηt
{ ∞∑
t=0
ρt(p3ht + p2ηt)
}
, (3.3)
with p2 and p3, the price per unit biomass of immature and adult fish respectively
and ρ = 1/(1 + δ) the discrete discount factor, with discount rate δ.
3.3 Analysis of the deterministic model
Proposition 3.1. The system 3.1, with hˆ = 0, has a positive equilibrium, Bˆ∗ if
and only if
R′(0) >
(1− a11)(1− a22)(1− a33)
a21a32 + a31(1− a22) := c. (3.4)
Proof. By simple algebra, if there exists an x > 0 such that R(x) = cx, then
there is a positive equilibrium, Bˆ∗, with Bˆ∗3 = x. Assume R
′(0) > c and define
f(x) := cx − R(x). By continuity of R′, there exists an x˜ > 0, sufficiently small,
such that R(x˜) > cx˜. Hence f(x˜) < 0. Since R is bounded, there exists an x > x˜
such that f(x) > 0. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
a positive x such that f(x) = 0, the solution of which defines the adult biomass
equilibrium. The reverse direction follows from writing down the implicit equation
for the equilibrium and applying the mean value theorem.
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If inequality (3.4) is not met, small populations fail to persist, even without
harvest. For the rest of this paper we assume a slightly stronger inequality is met,
namely R′(0) > (1+δ)3c, which guarantees that at low densities a fish in the water
is worth more than the revenue generated from harvesting that fish. Note, we will
also assume that aii < 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This allows for individual fish gaining
biomass without transitioning to the next stage of their life-cycle. However, due to
mortality, the average amount of biomass gained within a stage is not allowed to
grow. Without this assumption it is possible for the fish stock to grow unbounded.
We use the method of Lagrange multipliers (pg. 60 of (Clark, 2010)) to
solve for the equilibrium optimal harvest policy. The Lagrangian is
L =
∞∑
t=0
ρt{p3ht + p2ηt + ρλ1,t+1[R(B3,t − ht) + a11B1,t −B1,t+1]
+ ρλ2,t+1[a21B1,t + a22(B2,t − ηt)−B2,t+1]
+ ρλ3,t+1[a31B1,t + a32(B2,t − ηt) + a33(B3,t − ht)−B3,t+1]},
(3.5)
where ρλi,t+1 is the current value shadow price for Bi,t, the money someone would
pay for a small additional amount of biomass in the ith stage at time t+1. Taking
the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian,
∂L
∂B1,t
= ρt(ρa11λ1,t+1 + ρa21λ2,t+1 + ρa31λ2,t+1 − λ1,t) (3.6)
∂L
∂B2,t
= ρt(ρa22λ2,t+1 + ρa32λ3,t+1 − λ2,t) (3.7)
∂L
∂B3,t
= ρt(ρa33λ3,t+1 + ρR
′(Bt,3 − ht)λ1,t+1 − λ3,t) (3.8)
∂L
∂ηt
= ρt(p2 − ρa22λ2,t+1 − ρa32λ3,t+1) (3.9)
∂L
∂ht
= ρt(p3 − ρR′(Bt,3 − ht)λ1,t+1 − ρa33λ3,t+1), (3.10)
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yields a set of first-order necessary conditions for an interior solution, and therefore,
at equilibrium, optimality requires
λ1 = ρa11λ1 + ρa21λ2 + ρa31λ3 (3.11)
λ2 = ρa22λ2 + ρa32λ3 (3.12)
λ3 = ρa33λ3 + ρR
′(B3 − h)λ1 (3.13)
p2 = ρa22λ2 + ρa32λ3 (3.14)
p3 = ρR
′(B3 − h)λ1 + ρa33λ3 (3.15)
B1 = R(B3 − h) + a11B1 (3.16)
B2 = a21B1 + a22(B2 − η) (3.17)
B3 = a31B1 + a32(B2 − η) + a33(B3 − h). (3.18)
We note that in almost all cases there is no interior solution to the above system.
This is because equations (3.12) and (3.14) imply λ2 = p2, and equations (3.13) and
(3.15) imply λ3 = p3, but by equation (3.12) this would mean p2 = ρ(a22p2+a32p3).
So as long as p2 6= ρ(a22p2 + a32p3) there is no interior equilibrium solution with
both ∂L /∂ηt = 0 and ∂L /∂ht = 0.
However, it is still possible to have an equilibrium that occurs on the bound-
ary. That is a solution where one harvests all or none of at least one stage class.
Consider equations (3.11-3.13,3.15-3.18), that is the system where the shadow
prices and biomasses are in equilibrium, and also suppose that ∂L /∂ηt < 0 (which
form the Khun-Tucker conditions, see pg. 61 in (Clark, 2010)). In this case, ηt = 0
and there is no harvesting immature fish. From equations (3.13) and (3.15), we
have
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λ∗3 = p3, (3.19)
and hence with equations (3.11) and (3.12) we have
λ∗2 =
ρp3a32
1− ρa22 , (3.20)
λ∗1 =
ρ2p3a21a32 + ρp3a31(1− ρa22)
(1− ρa11)(1− ρa22) . (3.21)
With the equilibrium shadow prices the optimal escapement of adult fish, such
that ∂L /∂ht = 0, is given by
R′(σ∗) =
(1− ρa11)(1− ρa22)(1− ρa33)
ρ3a21a32 + ρ2a31(1− ρa22) . (3.22)
Because R is assumed to be concave on (0,∞), R′ is monotonic decreasing on
(0,∞). Therefore, if a positive solution to (3.22) exists, it is unique. We also note
that when the shadow prices are as in (3.19)
∂L
∂ηt
=
ρt
1− ρa22 [p2 − ρ(a22p2 + a32p3)],
(3.23)
which is negative if
ρ(a22p2 + a32p3) > p2. (3.24)
This condition means the discounted value of immature fish, as a result of survival
and growth, is greater than the marginal value of harvesting immature fish today,
p2. In other words, fish are more valuable in the water than on the dock. If this
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condition is met, and there is a positive solution for σ∗ as calculated in (3.22), we
can write the equilibrium biomass as
B∗1 =
R(σ∗)
1− a11 (3.25)
B∗2 =
a21R(σ
∗)
(1− a11)(1− a22) (3.26)
B∗3 =
[
a31 +
a21a32
1− a22
]
R(σ∗)
1− a11 + a33σ
∗. (3.27)
and the harvests as
h∗ =
a21a32R(σ
∗)
(1− a11)(1− a22) − (1− a33)σ
∗
η∗ = 0.
(3.28)
From (3.24), it is useful to define
δcrit :=
a32p3
p2
+ a22 − 1, (3.29)
the critical discount rate, for which it is equally profitable to harvest adults or
immatures. If δ < δcrit only adults should be harvested.
The question remains, what is the optimal equilibrium policy if δ > δcrit?
In this case you acquire more money by harvesting immature fish and putting that
money in the bank than you would from harvesting them as adults the following
year. In such a case we might suspect an interior solution for harvesting immature
fish and a boundary solution for harvesting adults. In this case, ∂L /∂ηt = 0, but
∂L /∂ht < 0, yielding a steady state system given by equations (3.11-3.14,3.16-
3.18). In this system, by equations (3.12) and (3.14)
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λ∗2 = p2, (3.30)
and hence with equations (3.11) and (3.12) we have
λ∗3 =
p2(1− ρa22)
ρa32
, (3.31)
λ∗1 =
ρp2a21a32 + p2a31(1− ρa22)
a32(1− ρa11) . (3.32)
Substituting into (3.13) yields the same adult optimal escapement, σ∗, as in (3.22),
and therefore the equilibrium juvenile biomass is still given by (3.25). However,
∂L
∂ht
= ρt[p3 − ρR′(B3 − h)λ1 − ρa33λ3] (3.33)
=
ρt−1
a32
[ρ(a22p2 + a32p3)− p2], (3.34)
which is negative for δ > δcrit. This means harvested immature fish are more
valuable than harvested adults. So in order to have an adult escapement of σ∗,
we harvest immatures, but let s∗ > 0 escape, so that enough immatures survive
and grow to B∗3 = σ
∗ adults. It is possible, if a31 and a33 are large enough, that
s∗ < 0, which is not feasible. It is also possible to have s∗ = 0, implying η∗ = B∗2
with σ∗ > 0, provided a large enough fraction of juveniles skip a stage to become
adults (a31 > 0) and sufficient escaped adults also survive (a33 > 0). Thus there
are two feasible cases.
Case 1. If δ > δcrit, and σ
∗ > 0, as calculated in (3.22), and
a31R(σ
∗)
1− a11 < (1− a33)σ
∗,
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some amount of immature biomass, s∗ > 0, must be allowed to escape harvest
in order to produce enough adults to let σ∗ adult biomass escape in the next
generation. In other words, not enough juveniles skip the immature life stage and
not enough adults survive to create σ∗ adult biomass to reproduce in the next
generation without the contribution from immatures. In this case, adults are not
harvested, yet B∗3 = σ
∗, and therefore,
B∗3 = σ
∗ = a31B∗1 + a32s
∗ + a33σ∗. (3.35)
Solving for s∗ yields
s∗ =
(1− a33)σ∗
a32
− a31R(σ
∗)
a32(1− a11)
B∗2 =
(a21a32 − a31a22)R(σ∗)
a32(1− a11) +
a22(1− a33)σ∗
a32
,
η∗ =
(a21a32 + a31a22 − a31)R(σ∗)
a32(1− a11) −
(1− a22)(1− a33)σ∗
a32
h∗ = 0.
(3.36)
A heat map of total discounted net revenue as a function of adult and immature
escapement, for parameters such that the conditions for this case are met, is shown
in Fig. 3.2.
Case 2. If δ > δcrit, and σ
∗ > 0, as calculated in (3.22), and
a31R(σ
∗)
1− a11 ≥ (1− a33)σ
∗,
juveniles and adults are contributing enough surplus biomass to the adult stage in
the next generation so that σ∗ adults can escape, even without any contribution
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from immatures. In this case all immatures should be harvested, and some fraction
of adults should be harvested as well. However, because we are harvesting from
the less valuable adults, adult escapement is not σ∗ as calculated in (3.22). In this
case, since all immatures are harvested, it helps to write a new reduced system.
That is
B1,t+1 = R(B3,t − ht) + a11B1,t
B3,t+1 = a31B1,t + a33(B3,t − ht),
(3.37)
max
ht
{ ∞∑
t=0
ρtp(ht + ρa21B1,t)
}
. (3.38)
The Lagrangian for this new system is
Lˆ =
∞∑
t=0
ρt{p(ht + ρa21B1,t) + ρλ1,t+1[R(B3,t − ht) + a11B1,t −B1,t+1]
+ ρλ3,t+1[a31B1,t + a33(B3,t − ht)−B3,t+1]}.
(3.39)
Using similar analysis as in the previous model we find that the optimal equilibrium
escapement of adults, σˆ∗ is given by
R′(σˆ∗) =
p3(1− ρa33)(1− ρa11)
ρ2(p2a21 + p3a31)
(3.40)
and
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B∗1 =
R(σˆ∗)
1− a11
B∗2 =
a21R(σˆ
∗)
1− a11
B∗3 =
a31R(σˆ
∗)
1− a11 + a33σˆ
∗
s∗ = 0,meaning η∗ = B∗2
h∗ =
a31R(σˆ
∗)
1− a11 + (a33 − 1)σˆ
∗
(3.41)
3.3.1 Closed form solutions for Logistic and Beverton-Holt
recruitment
Depending on the functional form of the recruitment function, R(σ), it is possible
to obtain closed form solutions for the optimal escapement at equilibrium. For
example if R is given by the logistic map with growth rate r > 1 and carrying
capacity k,
R(σ) = rσ
(
1− σ
k
)
(3.42)
then, if δ < δcrit, the optimal adult escapement is given by
σ∗ =
k
2r
[
r − (1− ρa11)(1− ρa22)(1− ρa33)
ρ3a21a32 + ρ2a31(1− ρa22)
]
. (3.43)
If δ > δcrit and a31R(σ
∗)/(1 − a11) < (1 − a33)σ∗, we harvest no adults and let
the amount of immatures that escape harvest be as in (3.35). If δ > δcrit and
a31R(σ
∗)/(1− a11) ≥ (1− a33)σ∗, then we harvest all of the immatures and let
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σˆ∗ =
k
2r
[
r − (1− ρa11)(1− ρa33)
ρ2(a21 + a31)
]
, (3.44)
adults escape harvest. Note in this example, the recruitment function can be
chaotic depending on the transition coefficients and the growth rate. Our analysis
will only hold at equilibrium. Hence it is appropriate to use our result for param-
eters such that the population approaches a stable equilibrium in the absence of
harvest, but possibly not for chaotic or periodic fluctuating populations. However,
our results will always hold for a monotonic increasing, concave R, such as the
Beverton-Holt function with parameters b1 and b2,
R(σ) =
b1σ
1 + b2σ
. (3.45)
In this case,
σ∗ =
1
b2
[√
ρ2b1[ρa21a32 + a31(1− ρa22)]
(1− ρa11)(1− ρa22)(1− ρa33) − 1
]
. (3.46)
Under a parameterization where δ < δcrit, we show a heat map of total discounted
net revenue as a function of adult and immature escapement in Fig. 3.1 and note
that discounted net revenue attains its maximum when all immature biomass and
σ∗ adult biomass escape harvest. We also show a similar heat map, for the case
where δ > δcrit and a31R(σ
∗)/(1− a11) < (1− a33)σ∗ (see Fig. 3.2).
If δ > δcrit and a31R(σ
∗)/(1− a11) ≥ (1− a33)σ∗,
45
σˆ∗ =
1
b2
[√
ρ2b1[a21 + a31]
(1− ρa11)(1− ρa33) − 1
]
. (3.47)
To confirm that our above analysis is in fact producing the best constant
escapement policy, we compared our analytic solutions to the best escapement
strategies found via numerical optimization (see online supplementary informa-
tion).
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Figure 3.1: A heat map of net revenue over a grid of adult and immature fish
escapement values, for a set of parameters where δ < δcrit. The black circle cor-
responds to the optimal solution from the bioeconomic model, letting σ∗ adult
fish escape and leaving all immature fish in the fishery. The discounted net rev-
enue for inadmissible strategies is set to zero (i.e. for adult/immature escape-
ment greater than equilibrium adult/immature biomass). Parameters are a32 =
1.4, a21 = 1.5, a11 = 0, a22 = 0.05, a33 = 0.1, b1 = 4.41, b2 = 0.000344, δ = 0.05.
Optimal escapement and harvest of adults is σ∗ = 619.3 and h∗ = 1, 402.2, respec-
tively.
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Figure 3.2: A heat map of net revenue over a grid of adult and immature fish
escapement values, for a set of parameters where δ > δcrit. The black circle
corresponds to the optimal solution from the bioeconomic model, letting s∗ im-
mature fish escape and leaving all adult fish in the fishery. The discounted net
revenue for inadmissible strategies is set to zero (i.e. for adult/immature escape-
ment greater than equilibrium adult/immature biomass). Parameters are a32 =
0.6, a21 = 1.5, a11 = 0, a22 = 0.05, a33 = 0.1, b1 = 4.41, b2 = 0.000344, δ = 0.05.
Optimal escapement and harvest of immatures is s∗ = 433.7 and η∗ = 546.9,
respectively.
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3.4 Stochastic model and analysis
In simple one dimensional bioeconomic models, constant escapement policies can
be optimal even when the biomass dynamics are stochastic. In this section, we
explore these policies for structured populations. To simplify the analysis we con-
sider two cases, one where only adult fish are harvested and the other where only
immatures are harvested, both at price p (which we justify after analyzing the
stochastic models). We show that environmental stochasticity affects optimal har-
vest in the two stage classes differently. Within each of these cases we first consider
the age structured case with a31 = a11 = a22 = a33 = 0, and for the case of adult
harvest extend the analysis to models closer to (3.1).
3.4.1 When harvesting only adults
Consider a simplified age structured model where adults die after spawning and
only adult fish are harvested.
B1,t+1 = z1,t+1R(B3,t − ht)
B2,t+1 = z2,t+1a21B1,t
B3,t+1 = z3,t+1a32B2,t,
(3.48)
The random variables zi,t are chosen such that the sequences {zi,t}t≥1 are each
independently and identically distributed on a closed subset of (0,∞) with E[zi,t] =
1, in such a way that zi,t and zj,t+m are independent for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
m > 0. In other words, we are allowing for correlation between age classes, but no
temporal autocorrelation. For example, one possibility for modeling the noise is
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zi,t = z˜t + i,t, (3.49)
where the sequences {z˜t}t≥1 and {i,t}t≥1, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are independently
and identically distributed on a subset of (0,∞), with E[z˜t] = q, and E[i,t] = 1−q,
where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. When q = 0, the age classes experience independent random
fluctuations. When q = 1, the noise is perfectly correlated between age classes.
Lastly we assume that the population is “self-sustaining” at the optimal
escapement level. For example, in the case where a31 = a11 = a22 = a33 = 0, σ
∗
self-sustaining means that z1z2z3a32a21R(σ
∗) ≥ σ∗, where zi is the lowest value zi,t
can attain. This assumption is standard in one dimensional bioeconomic models
(Clark, 2010) because it guarantees, B3,t − σt > 0, when the system is in sta-
tionary distribution and allows for solutions achieved through stochastic dynamic
programming arguments.
Because juvenile and immature fish always grow or die, and mature fish
die after spawning, equations (3.48) yield three independent cohorts. Therefore,
it suffices to find the optimal equilibrium escapement for a single cohort, only
tracking the population in the harvested age class. Without loss of generality,
consider the cohort, that is initially in the adult age class. The cohort’s dynamics
are given by
xτ+1 = ζτ+1a21a32R(xτ − hτ ),
x0 = B3,0
(3.50)
where xτ = B3,3τ is the adult biomass in the τth generation and ζτ+1 =
z3,3τ+3z2,3τ+2z1,3τ+1. The escapement policy that optimizes
50
E{ ∞∑
τ=0
ρ3τph3τ
}
. (3.51)
is
R′(σt) =
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
, (3.52)
since this formulation satisfies the one dimensional optimization problem with
fixed per unit cost and concave positive recruitment in (Reed, 1974). Note that
the optimal escapement is the same as in (3.22) when substituting a31 = a11 =
a22 = a33 = 0.
Now consider the full size structured model, but again assume fishing can
only occur in the adult size class. The model for adult harvest is
B1,t+1 = z1,t+1[R(σt) + a11B1,t]
B2,t+1 = z2,t+1[a21B1,t + a22B2,t]
B3,t+1 = z3,t+1[a31B1,t + a32B2,t + a33σt].
(3.53)
With zi,t as in (3.48). First we maximize expected discounted net revenue over a
fixed time horizon T ,
E
{
T∑
t=0
ρtpht
}
, (3.54)
and then let T →∞. We proceed with a calculation similar to the one in section
7.3 of (Clark, 2010), but extend it to our three dimensional framework. Define the
value function
51
V (Bt) = max
σt
{p(B3,t − σt) + ρE{V (Bt+1)}}. (3.55)
At the final time it is clearly optimal to harvest everything. Hence, σ∗T = 0, yielding
V (BT ) = pB3,T . (3.56)
Therefore,
V (BT−1) = max
σT−1
{p(B3,T−1 − σT−1) + ρE{pB3,T}}
= max
σT−1
{p(B3,T−1 − σT−1) + ρE{pz3,T [a31B1,T−1 + a32B2,T−1 + a33σT−1]}}.
(3.57)
Since a33 < 1, and Bi,T−1 is known for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, σ∗T−1 = 0, meaning
V (BT−1) = p(B3,T−1 + ρ[a31B1,T−1 + a32B2,T−1]). (3.58)
To calculate σ∗T−2, we substitute V (BT−1), into the formula for V (BT−2) to get
V (BT−2) = max
σT−2
{p(B3,T−2 − σT−2) + ρpE{
z3,T−1[a31B1,T−2 + a32B2,T−2 + a33σT−2]− σ∗T−1 + ρE{
a31z1,T−1[R(σT−2) + a11B1,T−2]
+ a32z2,T−1[a21B1,T−2 + a22B2,T−2]}}}.
(3.59)
Define
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wT−2(σT−2) = (ρa33 − 1)σT−2 + ρ2a31R(σT−2). (3.60)
Since Bi,T−2, for all i, are constants, the σT−2 that maximizes wT−2 also maximizes
the argument of (3.59), and hence σ∗T−2 is the solution to
R′(σ∗T−2) =
1− ρa33
ρ2a31
. (3.61)
As we proceed backwards in time, to calculate the optimal escapement strategy at
time T − n, σ∗T−n, using the methods above, a pattern emerges for wT−n(σT−n).
That is, for n ≥ 3,
wT−n(σT−n) =− σT−n + ρa33σT−n + a31R(σT−n)
n∑
j=2
ρjaj−211
+ a32a21R(σT−n)
n∑
j=3
j−3∑
i=0
ρjai22a
j−i−3
11 .
(3.62)
Therefore, as T →∞ and n→∞, with n < T , we have
w(σ) =− σ + ρa33σ + ρ
2a31
1− a11ρR(σ) +
ρ3a32a21
(1− ρa22)(1− ρa11)R(σ), (3.63)
which means that at a stationary distribution the optimal escapement strategy is
given by
R′(σ) =
(1− ρa33)(1− ρa22)(1− ρa11)
ρ2a31(1− ρa22) + ρ3a32a21 , (3.64)
the same as in our deterministic analysis.
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3.4.2 When harvesting immatures
Now consider the second model, where only immatures are harvested.
B1,t+1 = z1,t+1R(B3,t)
B2,t+1 = z2,t+1a21B1,t
B3,t+1 = z3,t+1a32(B2,t − ηt).
(3.65)
In this case the single cohort dynamics are given by
yτ+1 = ξτ+1a21R(ντ+1a32[yτ − ητ ]),
y0 = B2,0
(3.66)
where yτ = B2,3τ is the immature biomass in the τth generation of a cohort which
started as immatures, ξτ+1 = z2,3τ+3z1,3τ+2, and ντ+1 = z3,3τ+1. We wish to find
the escapement that optimizes
E
{
T∑
τ=0
ρ3τpη3τ
}
. (3.67)
Since R is a function of a random variable, we can no longer directly apply
the theorem from (Reed, 1979), but we can use a similar stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming argument as we did for to derive the optimal escapement policy. Define
the value function,
V (yτ ) = max
sτ
{p(yτ − sτ ) + ρ3E [V (yτ+1)]}. (3.68)
Iterating backwards, we find that s∗T = 0, and
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V (yT−1) = max
sT−1
{p(yT−1 − sT−1) + ρ3E [pξTa21R(νTa32sT−1)]}. (3.69)
Since yT−1 is assumed to be known, finding s∗T−1 is equivalent to finding the s that
maximizes
w(s) = −s+ ρ3a21E [R(ντ+1a32s)] . (3.70)
Therefore the optimal s is the solution to
E [ντ+1R′(ντ+1a32s)] =
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
. (3.71)
Note that for earlier τ the form of w is the same and hence if we take T to infinity,
the solution to (3.71) is the optimal stationary immature escapement. For a logistic
recruitment function, this equation has a closed form solution, since
E [ντ+1R′(ντ+1a32s)] = r − 2ra32st
k
E
[
ν2τ+1
]
, (3.72)
which means the optimal escapement is
st =
[
k
2ra32
] [
r − (1 + δ)
3
a32a21
] [
1
1 + var(ντ+1)
]
. (3.73)
which is just 1/(1 + var[z3,t]) times the optimal escapement policy for a deter-
ministic model with logistic recruitment. This means, that when recruitment and
survival vary randomly over time, if a manager chooses to fish immature biomass,
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he should fish more aggressively than in the deterministic case, because the non-
linear recruitment function lessens the benefit from good years. However, if the
manager harvests adults, he should do so as if the system is deterministic.
In order to verify these predictions, we simulated 20 million realizations
of this system with the environmental noise distributed as a discrete probability
distribution, zt = 0.8 with probability 5/7 and zt = 1.5 with probability 2/7, under
eight immature escapement strategies including the analytic stochastic optimal
escapement rule (3.73) and the deterministic optimal escapement rule (see figure
3.3). Note that the calculations require the population to be self sustaining at
the optimal escapement value, such that B2,t − s∗t ≥ 0 for all t, at stationary
distribution. When this assumption is violated, the optimal escapement policy
is still lower than in the deterministic setting, however 1/(1 + var(zt)) may be
an overcorrection. See figure 3.4 for an example where three “bad years” can
cause less immature biomass to return to the immature phase than what initially
escaped three years prior, and notice that the general concept that you fish more
aggressively in the stochastic model, with logistic recruitment, is still true.
3.4.3 The effect of the recruitment function
The logistic recruitment function allowed for a closed form analytic solution to
equation (3.71). However, there is no analytically tractable solution to (3.71) for
most density dependent recruitment functions. We would like to know if the re-
sult that a manager should fish immatures more aggressively under environmental
stochasticity is general for all density dependent recruitment functions.
Let s∗ be the optimal escapement of immature fish if there is no stochas-
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ticity. In this case equilibrium spawner biomass is σ∗ = a32s∗. We note that
if
E [ντ+1R′(ντ+1σ∗)] >
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
, (3.74)
then the expected biological growth rate is higher than the discount rate and one
should therefore leave more fish in the ocean (i.e. increase escapement, higher than
s∗). If
E [ντ+1R′(ντ+1σ∗)] <
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
, (3.75)
then escapement should be decreased under environmental stochasticity. Define
f(ν) = νR′(νσ∗). (3.76)
By Jensen’s Inequality, if f is strictly convex on the support of ν,
E [f(ν)] > f(E [ν]) = f(1) =
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
. (3.77)
Similarly if f is strictly concave on the support of ν
E [f(ν)] < f(E [ν]) = f(1) =
(1 + δ)3
a32a21
. (3.78)
This means that if f ′′(ν) > 0, for all ν, equation (3.74) is satisfied and it is more
profitable to increase escapement. If f ′′(ν) < 0, for all ν, (3.75) is satisfied and it
is more profitable to decrease escapement. Noting that
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f ′′(ν) = 2σ∗R′′(νσ∗) + (σ∗)2νR′′′(νσ∗), (3.79)
it is possible to calculate when fishing should be more or less aggressive for specific
recruitment functions even when such functions do not allow for tractable solutions
to equation (3.71).
For logistic recruitment, (3.42), we note that f ′′(ν) < 0 for all ν > 0 and
σ∗ > 0, meaning it is more profitable to decrease the escapement of immatures.
This agrees with our analytic optimal escapement rule (3.73).
More aggressive fishing than in the deterministic case is also optimal if
recruitment follows a Ricker curve,
R(σ) = b1σe
−b2σ, (3.80)
with b2 > 0. In this case f
′′(1) < 0 for all σ∗ < 1/b2. Since for Ricker recruitment
R′(σ) < 0 for all σ > 1/b2, by equation (3.22), σ∗ will always be less than 1/b2.
Therefore, as long as the support of ν does not contain values large enough that
νσ∗ > 1/b2, it will be more profitable to decrease escapement. It should be noted
that since the Ricker function is not concave on it’s entire domain, our analysis is
not guaranteed to hold in this case. However, we simulated expected discounted net
revenue when harvesting immatures in a stochastic fishery with a Ricker spawner-
recruitment relationship, and the example agrees with our result (Fig. 3.5).
Similarly it can be shown that for the monotone Recruitment function
R(σ) = b1 log(1 + b2σ) that it is also always profitable to decrease escapement.
However, this is not true for all monotone recruitment functions. For Beverton-
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Holt recruitment, (3.45), both more aggressive and more conservative fishing can
be optimal depending on the parameters. In this case, f ′′(ν) > 0 for all ν if
b2σ
∗min(ν) > 2, and f ′′(ν) < 0 for all ν if b2σ∗max(ν) < 2. Substituting in
σ∗ =
1
b2
[√
ρ3b1a21a32 − 1
]
, (3.81)
means that it is more profitable to increase immature escapement if
√
ρ3b1a21a32 >
1 + 2/min(ν) and decrease escapement if
√
ρ3b1a21a32 < 1 + 2/max(ν).
The above example highlights how optimal immature escapement, under
environmental stochasticity depends on the third derivative of R. Since the second
derivative of R will be negative for all compensatory and over-compensatory re-
cruitment functions near σ∗, it is always more profitable to fish more aggressively
when R′′′ is negative. However, increasing escapement can be more profitable if
R′′′(σ∗) is positive, especially if σ∗ is large.
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Table 3.1: The effect of environmental stochasticity on the optimal escapement of
immature fish for different spawner-recruitment relationships when the variance of
the environmental noise is small.
Recruitment
Function
Functional form parameter
constraints
Effect of stochastic-
ity on immature es-
capement
Discrete Logistic R(σ) = b1σ(1− σ/b2) b1 > 0, b2 > 0 decrease escapement
Ricker R(σ) = b1σe
−b2σ b1 > 0, b2 > 0 decrease escapement
Beverton-Holt R(σ) = b1σ/(1 + b2σ) b1 > 0, b2 > 0 decrease escapement if
σ∗ < 2/b2, increase es-
capement if σ∗ > 2/b2
Log R(σ) = b1 log(1 + b2σ) b1 > 0, b2 > 0 decrease escapement
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Figure 3.3: Expected net revenue for eight immature fish escapement strate-
gies, averaged over ten million simulations (confidence intervals are negligible
due to the large sample size). The green dashed line is the analytic “vari-
ance corrected” optimal escapement strategy in the stochastic logistic recruit-
ment model (563.0) and the blue line corresponds to the optimal escapement
strategy for the corresponding deterministic model (619.3). The parameters are
a32 = 0.83, a21 = 2, r = 1.65, K = 2000, p = 5, T = 55, δ = 0.1 and zt = 0.8 with
probability 0.7143 and zt = 1.5 with probability 0.2857.
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Figure 3.4: Expected net revenue for eight immature fish escapement strate-
gies, averaged over ten million simulations with 95 percent confidence intervals.
z1,t = z2,t = z3,t, with z1,t distributed uniformly on (0.4, 1.6). The green dashed
line is the “variance corrected” optimal escapement strategy in the stochastic lo-
gistic recruitment model and the blue line corresponds to the optimal escapement
strategy for the corresponding deterministic model. The parameters are a32 =
0.9, a21 = 1.05, a11 = a22 = a33 = 0, r = 1.5, K = 2000, p = 5, T = 55, δ = 0.1.
Note that in this case the assumptions used to derive the optimal escapement
strategy do not hold because B2,t − s∗t ≥ 0 requirement is not satisfied for all t,
since 0.42a21R(0.4a32s
∗) < s∗ (meaning a series of bad years can send the stock
below the calculated optimal escapement level). However, the general concept that
you fish more aggressively in the stochastic model is still true in this example.
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Figure 3.5: Expected discounted net revenue for 9 immature escapements for a
stochastic fishery with Ricker recruitment with 95 % confidence intervals, averaged
over one million simulations. The blue dashed line is the optimal escapement
strategy for the corresponding deterministic model (1390.7), calculated by solving
(3.22) numerically using an implementation of the Newton-Raphson method in
R. The parameters are a32 = 1.2, a21 = 1.1, b1 = 2, b2 = 0.0002, p2 = 3.43, p3 =
1.66, T = 70, δ = 0.08 and zt = 0.8 with probability 5/7 and zt = 1.5 with
probability 2/7.
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3.4.4 Justification of single stage harvest
In the stochastic case, we only calculated the optimal escapement strategy as-
suming exclusive harvest of either adults or immatures. This was a mathematical
simplification. However, exclusive harvest will be optimal in the stochastic system
in some circumstances.
Consider model (3.53), with the addition of immature harvest and stage
specific pricing, as in the deterministic optimization problem (p2 and p3, the price
per unit biomass of immatures and adults respectively). Below, we prove that
under environmental stochasticity, it is less profitable, in expectation, to increase
immature harvest from zero, given any self-sustaining adult escapement strategy,
as long as the condition for exclusive adult harvest in the deterministic model is
met.
Proposition 3.2. When letting σ units of adult biomass escape harvest, assuming
σ is self-sustaining, if δ < δcrit, then in comparison to harvesting ht = B3,t − σ
adults and ηt = 0 immatures, harvesting an additional small amount of immature
biomass ηt > 0, decreases expected discounted net revenue.
Proof. Assume a self sustaining adult escapement strategy, σ, and let J be expected
net revenue of harvesting B2,t−s adult biomass and ηt immature biomass, for each
year t,
J = E
{ ∞∑
t=0
ρt(p2ηt + p2[B3,t − σ])
}
. (3.82)
We show that if δ < δcrit, then ∂J/∂ητ < 0, for all ητ such that σ adult escapement
is self-sustaining.
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∂J
∂ητ
= E
{
ρτp2 − ρτ+1ητz3,τ+1
(
1 +
∞∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
z2,τ−jρiai22
)}
= ρτ
(
p2 − ρp3a32
1− ρa22
)
.
(3.83)
Which is less than zero if δ < δcrit, as defined in equation (3.29).
Consider (3.65) with the addition of adult harvest and stage specific pricing.
In this case, a manager should not harvest any adults for small fluctuations in adult
biomass above optimal adult escapement (the expected adult biomass that results
from letting a32s
∗ immature biomass escape). However, when fluctuations are
large, in good years, there is potentially a benefit to harvesting some excess adult
biomass prior to recruitment. This can be summarized as a proposition.
Proposition 3.3. When letting s units of immature biomass escape harvest, as-
suming s is self-sustaining, if ρ2p2a21R
′(max(z3,t)a32s) > p3, then in comparison
to harvesting ηt = B2,t− s immatures and ht = 0 adults, harvesting any additional
adults ht > 0, decreases expected discounted net revenue.
Proof. Assume an immature escapement strategy, s, is deployed and let J be
expected net revenue,
J = E
{ ∞∑
t=0
ρt(p3ht + p2[B2,t − s])
}
. (3.84)
We show that if ρ2p2a21R
′(max(z3,t)a32s) > p3, then ∂J/∂hτ < 0, at hτ = 0, for
any arbitrary time τ .
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∂J
∂hτ
= E
{
ρτp3 − ρτ+2p2z2,τ+2z1,τ+1a21R′(z3,τa32sτ − hτ )
}
≤ ρτ [p3 − ρ2p2a21R′(max(z3,t)a32sτ − hτ )].
(3.85)
The inequality is guaranteed by the assumption that R is concave. Plugging in
hτ = 0 yields the desired result.
3.5 Hard clam example
Historically, the hard clam fishery has been one of the most lucrative fisheries in
New York State and the largest shellfish fishery on the east coast of North America
(Bricelj et al., 1980). We use a snap-shot of this fishery circa 1980 as an example
for our model. In New York, the clams are sold in three common varieties: little-
necks (width < 36.5mm), cherrystones (width < 41.3mm) and chowders (width >
41.3mm) (Bricelj et al., 1980). As the clams grow, their flesh becomes tough and
less desirable. Although smaller clams command the highest price, it is illegal to
harvest clams with a width less than 25.4mm in the United States (Bricelj et al.,
1980). We classify the clams that are too small to be legally harvested as juve-
niles, littleneck clams as immatures and both cherrystones and chowders as adults.
Clams with a width less than 25mm do not typically contribute to reproduction
(Bricelj et al., 1980). While littleneck clams can reproduce, their average fecundity
is only about one third of cherrystones and chowders and hence we ignore it as
a mathematical simplification. On average it takes juveniles two years to grow
larger than 25.4mm, and another two years to become cherrystones (Kennish and
Loveland, 1980). The probability a juvenile survives is 0.16 (Connell, 1983) and in
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the absence of harvest, immature and adult survival is 0.91 (Carriker, 1961). The
respective weights of the three sizes of clam were calculated from their shell length
as reported by Anderson et al. (1978) using the relationship weight[g] = (0.671 ×
length[cm])3 (Haskin, 1954), yielding juvenile, immature and adult clam weights
of 0.01, 0.13 and 0.35 lbs respectively. The above assumptions yield parameters,
a11 = (survival prob.)(transition prob.) = 0.16× 1/2 = 0.08,
a21 = (survival prob.)(transition prob.)(growth) = 0.16× 1/2× 0.13/0.01 = 1.04,
with the rest calculated similarly, giving a22 = 0.46, a32 = 1.23, and a33 = 0.91.
An Adult clam produces, on average, seven million eggs per spawning event, but
the probability of larvae survival is very small, estimated at 0.00058 over five days
(Carriker, 1961). Assuming larva survival continues at this rate for the ten days it
takes to develop into a juvenile clam (studies reviewed in Fegley (2001) ranged from
eight days to two weeks) and that recruitment follows the Beverton-Holt model,
then b1 = 2.35. The carrying capacity of this fishery is unknown, so we set it to
be equal to the largest reported historical landing (as reported in Conrad (1982)),
yielding b2 = 6.08× 10−5. On October 1, 1980 the per pound price ratio p3/p2 was
0.24 (Conrad, 1982). We set the discount rate to match the interest rate of a 10
year U.S. treasury note, which was δ = 0.1175 (Oct. 1, 1980).
In 1980, due to high inflation, it was much more valuable to fish the imma-
ture stage class exclusively (Fig. 3.7). The sensitivity of the optimal equilibrium
biomass to the parameter values is shown in Fig. 3.6. As is standard for bioe-
conomic models, higher discount rates lead to lower equilibrium stock biomass.
Equilibrium biomass increases with aij. If a22 is small, only immatures are har-
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vested, but for large a22 harvest switches to adults and stock sizes increase. As
a31 increases, optimal harvest switches from only fishing immatures to harvesting
some adults in addition to all of the immatures. This is important because it says
that if the probability of transitioning from a sub-legal size clam directly into a
cherrystone was underestimated, it could explain why cherrystones and chowders
are harvested in practice.
Using the parameters above and a discount rate of δ = 0.05 we consider
adding environmental stochasticity to this example as described in (3.48), with
z1,t = z2,t = z3,t and z1,t independently identically distributed such that z1,t =
0.8 with probability 5/7 and z1,t = 1.5 with a probability 2/7. In this case,
stochasticity means the best strategy is to fish more conservatively than in the
deterministic scenario (see Fig. 3.8). Based on our analytic calculation, we would
expect this result because high adult survivorship, a33 = 0.91, means σ
∗ > 2/b2. 1
If stochastic fluctuations are higher for hard clam than in this hypothetical
example, proposition (3.3) also suggests a possible reason for why commercial
fishing operations harvest adults in practice, at least in good years.
1Note we assumed a33 = 0 in our analytic calculation for immature harvest under environ-
mental stochasticity. However, the calculation provides intuition for the case when a33 > 0.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibrium adult (black solid line), immature (red dotted line) and
juvenile (green dashed line) biomass as a function of each parameter. Recruitment
is Beverton-Holt and baseline parameter values are a11 = 0.08, a21 = 1.04, a22 =
0.46, a32 = 1.23, a33 = 0.91, δ = 0.05, p2 = 1.01, p3 = 0.24, b1 = 2.3, and b2 =
6.08 × 10−5 and were chosen to match values reported in the literature for hard
clam.
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Figure 3.7: A bifurcation diagram for when it is optimal to harvest immature
clams vs. adult clams, given the life history parameters for hard clam. The
dividing line is the discount rate, δcrit, at which it is equally profitable to harvest
either stage class, as a function of the price ratio p3/p2. Parameters values are
a11 = 0.08, a21 = 1.12, a22 = 0.46, a32 = 1.17, a33 = 0.91, b1 = 2.3, b2 = 6.08× 10−5.
The point labeled 1980 correspond to the price ratio from data in (Conrad, 1982)
and discount rate matching the interest rate on a 10 year U.S. treasury note.
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Figure 3.8: Expected discounted net revenue for hard clam escapement levels in
the stochastic model (black closed circles with 95 % confidence intervals) and for
the deterministic model (Red open circles). The red dashed line corresponds to
the theoretical optimal escapement in the deterministic model.
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3.6 Discussion
While optimal harvest strategies for age structured populations have been
widely studied in the bioeconomics literature, little is known about how environ-
mental stochasticity affects the optimal harvest of structured populations. In this
paper, we developed optimal escapement rules for a stage structured fish stock,
where transitions between all classes were possible (except for shrinking) and used
a stochastic version of the model to extend classic theoretical results on the op-
timal harvest of stochastic one dimensional models (Reed, 1979) to structured
populations.
Two discrete time, size structured models have been analyzed previously
(Getz and Haight, 1989; Tahvonen, 2014). Some aspects of Tahvonen’s model are
more general than ours, including a nonlinear objective function and the possi-
bility that all harvested stage classes can reproduce. These generalities combined
with the assumption that harvest occurs after adult recruitment, can lead to the
existence of cyclical interior solutions corresponding to partial harvests of both
immature and adult stages. Tohoven, reveals this possibility by studying the sta-
bility of optimal harvest solutions. Since our primary goal was to study the effect
of stochasticity we leave stability analysis in our deterministic setting as future
direction.
However, other aspects of Tahoven’s model are more restrictive, such as the
assumption that individuals do not skip stages and that dynamics are determinis-
tic. Some species can undergo short periods of rapid growth with high variability
between individuals, and hence skipping stages may be common for structured
populations. For example, it is possible for a large juvenile clam to transition into
a cherrystone in one year (Kennish and Loveland, 1980). We have shown how
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skipping stages can create an additional case where it is optimal to harvest all of
the early stage and in addition partially harvest the late stage, even though it is
less valuable.
For a linear objective function, as in one dimensional models (Reed, 1979),
stochasticity does not affect optimal escapement, as long as the optimal escapement
level is self-sustaining and the harvest of reproductive individuals occurs prior to
recruitment. However, if harvest occurs during an immature stage, we showed that
random fluctuations in stock dynamics can affect the optimal escapement strategy
depending on the shape of the recruitment function.
In the stochastic model, we assumed the manager was either exclusively
harvesting immatures or adults. Exclusive adult harvest is indeed optimal under
the same condition as in the deterministic problem. However, when this condition
is not met, we can only show that exclusive immature harvest is optimal for tightly
bounded noise. For large fluctuations, partial harvest of adults and immatures may
be optimal, and hence future analysis is required to determine the best harvest
strategies.
The effect of stochasticity on optimal harvest with nonlinear utility remains
an open question for stage structured fisheries. It should be possible to do similar
analysis to what we have done here if the objective function is separable. For one
dimensional models, Reed (1979) showed that if utility is concave, stochasticity in-
creases optimal escapement and if utility is convex, stochasticity decreases optimal
escapement. It is important to note that concave utility in Reed’s one dimensional
models and concave recruitment in our stage structured model, when harvesting
immatures, have a diametrically opposite effect on optimal escapement if the third
derivative of the recruitment function is negative. Future analysis should shine
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light on the interplay between these two nonlinearities when determining optimal
harvest in stochastic fisheries.
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CHAPTER 4
HUMAN JUDGMENT VS. MATHEMATICAL MODELS FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF BIOLOGICAL POPULATIONS
Abstract
Despite major advances in computing, optimization and ecological modeling there
has been resistance to using these techniques in the actual practice of environmen-
tal management. Mathematical models have the advantage of providing objective
criteria for making environmental decisions. However, models that mis-specify key
ecological processes can greatly reduce profits and sustainability. While managers
using experience and judgment develop more subjective decisions, their process is
not constrained by rigid mathematical assumptions and therefore can potentially
be more flexible than model based policies. In this chapter we explore how well
humans, using their experience and judgment, manage simulated populations and
compare their management outcomes to the performance of a variety of mathe-
matical models with varying degrees of correctness. We consider models that (1)
perfectly represent the system (2) specify the system correctly but must estimate
parameters in real time from the data (3) mis-specify the functional forms in the
system and (4) ignore age structure. Humans on average perform much worse than
the models in cases 1 - 3, but in some scenarios models can still produce worse
outcomes than those resulting from human management. This highlights the pos-
sibility that active adaptive management, potentially reducing present benefits in
order to learn about the system and improve future management, may improve
long term objectives. In case 4, when models ignore age structure, they gener-
ated poorly performing management decisions. However, they still outperformed
humans using experience and judgment 66 percent of the time.
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4.1 Introduction
In the past 50 years environmental management has benefited from major
advances in decision science. Theoreticians, scientists and government agencies
widely agree that given appropriate budgets, adaptive management, the iterative
use of system monitoring, modeling, and optimization to reduce uncertainty and
improve objectives, is the best way to manage a biological population (Walters,
1986; Possingham et al., 2001; Williams, 2001; Stankey et al., 2005). While man-
agers often do practice some components of adaptive management by collecting
data and making decisions based on their expertise, with the exception of a few
lucrative large scale management problems in fisheries, waterfowl and forestry (e.g.
Sainsbury, 1988; Gerber et al., 2005; Moore and Conroy, 2006; Nichols et al., 2015),
very few managers use dynamic modeling and optimization for environmental de-
cision making.
One potential reason for the resistance to using mathematical modeling in
management is that it’s unclear how much modeling and optimization actually
improve management outcomes over expert opinion. Experiments in management
are in general not repeatable. That is, once a manager makes a decision based on
their expertise, it is usually impossible to compare the outcome to how well an
alternative decision, aided by a mathematical model, would have done.
In this chapter we take a first step towards quantifying the economic bene-
fits of using simple dynamic models and optimization methods, rather than human
intuition, to manage biological populations, by comparing the outcomes from hu-
mans and models managing simulated populations. To do this, students in multiple
college classes played an online game where they managed a simulated fishery. The
data from each game was saved on a server, and therefore we were able to com-
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pare exactly how mathematical models would have played, compared to how the
students actually played, for each unique instance of the game.
We found that mathematical models, on average, performed much better
than humans, even when the models incorrectly specified the states of the system
and the functional form of the dynamics. However, humans operating based on
experience and judgment, without the aid of mathematics, sometimes made better
management decisions than theoretical models when (1) population dynamics ex-
hibited large random fluctuations in biomass due to environmental stochasticity,
and (2) past data used for model fitting, generated by the user playing a short
practice game, was restricted to a narrow window of population biomasses. When
both (1) and (2) were satisfied, it was difficult to fit the dynamic models to the
data, and poor fits led to poor management decisions.
These results emphasize the importance of techniques from active adaptive
management when using modeling to make environmental decisions, otherwise risk
adverse managers might prefer intuition compared to using simple mathematical
models. Ultimately, because the models greatly improved management outcomes
on average, but performed poorly in some scenarios, we recommend that managers
use models to aid decision making but recognize that modeling will sometimes
require human intervention and therefore cannot act as a replacement for expert
judgment.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Experiments
Students played two online “games”, accessed using a web browser, where they
earned “points” corresponding to the profits from managing a simulated herring
and pacific salmon fishery. Below we describe the experiment for the herring fishery
game and then provide an explanation for how the salmon game was different.
The students played the game using their laptops during the lecture period
of two courses, “Environmental Conservation” at Cornell University and “Princi-
ples of Biology” at Ithaca College, and at the “Graduate Student Science Collo-
quium” at Cornell University. Prior to managing each fishery, the students filled
out a multiple choice survey that asked them their major, educational experience,
fishing experience, and environmental management experience. See section 7.1 for
a copy of the survey.
After the survey, each game showed a page of directions describing the
fish stock’s population dynamics. In addition, the game facilitator read a script
aloud reiterating the points listed on the page. This included statements about
the existence of a fishery carrying capacity, measurement error, environmental
randomness out of the managers control and how their performance would be
scored. See section 7.2 for a copy of the game directions. Before starting the
game each student was randomly assigned a σ between 0 and 0.25. Students
with high σ experienced large random variation in stock biomass unrelated to
their management actions. Before playing the game the students played an 8 turn
practice game. This served three purposes: (1) they developed experience with
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the fishery (2) we used the data from the practice game to identify students who
didn’t understand the directions and (3) it provided a set of “past data” for the
models and students to use as a basis for making decisions in the future.
When the user started the game, they were presented with 3 harvest data
points, and the resulting biomasses from the deterministic version of the model
underlying the simulated population dynamics, to give them some context of the
range of harvest values they could potentially enter. We chose to use the determin-
istic model for this purpose so that all users saw the exact same past data before
playing the game.
The game showed the user plots of harvest, estimated remaining biomass
in the fishery, and profit vs. time. At the beginning of each turn of the game,
the user entered an amount of biomass they wanted to harvest into a textbox,
clicked enter, and then the remaining biomass, post-harvest, grew according to
the models that governed the simulated fishery, and the result was displayed on
the screen numerically. In addition, all plots updated, adding the players harvest
choice to the harvest plot, the resulting biomass to the biomass plot and the new
accumulated profit to the total profit plot. See figure 4.1 for a picture of the game
display.
The the user’s score was the discounted net profit accumulated over the
game, with a discount rate of 0.03 and a constant price of 10,000 dollars per ton
of biomass caught. In addition, the user received a bonus added to their score
at the end of the game, which was the discounted profit that would have been
generated by harvesting all of the remaining biomass left in the fishery after the
game was over. The bonus prevents optimal users from harvesting everything
on the last turn. Without adding the bonus, the user’s score would be highly
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sensitive to their last harvest decision. This bonus is explained to the user in the
game directions (see section 7.2).
Figure 4.1: Game play for the unstructured herring fish game.
After a student completed their last turn, the game displayed their score in
addition to a leaderboard, which included the scores and initials of the top players
in the class, up to that point in time. The leaderboard provided an external
incentive to play well. However, the students did not receive a course grade or
monetary incentives based on performance.
Throughout the game, data was stored locally on the user’s computer using
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cookies. Upon exiting the game, this anonymous data was then sent to a server,
using PHP (a server-side programing language for web development, Welling and
Thomson, 2003), and stored in a database. This data included the time the user
finished playing the game, an anonymous user ID number, the student’s answers to
the survey questions, the environmental noise variable σ, total profit (i.e. “points”)
and their time series of harvest decisions, resulting biomasses, realizations of envi-
ronmental noise and measurement error, and in addition the analogous data from
their practice game. By recording the environmental noise and measurement error
time series data, experienced by the user, we were able to compare how any strategy
(in our case strategies generated by optimization models) would have performed
playing that user’s exact instance of the game.
After playing the unstructured herring game, the student was directed via a
link to the salmon game. Using cookies, the anonymous user ID number from the
herring game was saved and recorded along with a unique user ID number for the
salmon game as well. In the salmon game, the fishery population dynamics were
age-structured, so the game directions also included information on the salmon’s
life cycle, which consisted of juvenile (1 year-old) and immature (2 year-old) fish
survival and growth and adult fish (3 year-old) reproduction. On each turn of
the game, the user entered the biomass of adult and immature fish they chose to
harvest in two side-by-side textboxes. Plots of the student’s harvest and biomass
time series data were the same as for the herring fishery, except now each plot
had two curves, one for immature fish and one for adult fish. The user could not
observe or harvest juvenile biomass. See figure 4.2 for a picture of the game display
in the age structured game.
The user’s score in the age-structured game was similar to the unstructured
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game, except discounted net profit was summed over both adult and immature
harvest, and the bonus was the discounted profit that would have been generated
by harvesting all of the remaining adult biomass for three years after the game
was over (it takes 3 years for the recruits at the end of the game to return to be
harvested as adults).
Figure 4.2: Game play for age structured salmon fish game.
Another goal of this study was to collaborate with instructors to incorporate
the game into their curriculum to facilitate active learning. Therefore, while the
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students played each version of this game multiple times, for pedagogical reasons,
students were only asked to try their hardest to score the most amount of points
possible during their first game. After everyone had finished their first game, they
were allowed to collaborate and experiment, to facilitate students learning the
principles of conservation biology, and therefore we did not include the students’
latter turns in the analysis.
4.2.2 Simulated population dynamics
The herring fish game was governed by a simple unstructured, one dimensional
model, where the manager chooses to harvest ht tons of biomass in year t, and the
resulting biomass in year t + 1, Bt+1, is a nonlinear function of the biomass that
escaped harvest in year t, R(Bt − ht), times a log-normally distributed random
number, zt, with mean one and standard deviation σ
1
Bt+1 = ztR(Bt − ht). (4.1)
We choose R to be the Beverton-Holt recruitment function, to exclude the possi-
bility of complicated chaotic and periodic dynamics in the absence of harvest,
R(B) =
b1B
1 + b2B
, (4.2)
where b1 is per unit biomass recruitment at low densities and b2 controls the car-
rying capacity of the population.
1In standard log-normal notation this means z ∼ lnN (ln(1/√1 + σ2),√ln (1 + σ2)). In other
words, the mean of the lognormal random variable is one, the mean of the log transformed
variable, µ, is actually negative.
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The manager observes a stock biomass of mtBt, in year t, where mt is a
log-normally distributed random variable with mean one and standard deviation
0.025. In other words, the user experiences a measurement error of mt − 1 in year
t.
The age structured fish game is based on the life cycle of Coho Salmon,
including three independent cohorts that undergo a three stage life cycle. Juvenile
fish live in the river and survive and grow into small fish which swim downstream
to the ocean where they mature, and finally they swim up stream to spawn and die.
The manager sets a total allowable catch (which is perfectly realized) of h2,t for
immature fish and h3,t for adult fish. Adult fish harvest occurs prior to recruitment.
B1,t+1 = ztR(B3,t − h3,t)
B2,t+1 = zta21B1,t
B3,t+1 = zta32(B2,t − h2,t).
(4.3)
We parameterized the two models by starting with rough estimates from the lit-
erature and then adjusted the values so that the growth rate of our hypothetical
herring (unstructured) and coho salmon (age-structured) populations matched.
The average 3 year old coho salmon weighs 8.0 pounds and the average 2 year
old salmon weighs about 3.1 pounds (Marr et al., 1944). A typical survival prob-
ability for pacific salmon populations is 0.8 in good years and 0.28 in bad years
(Worden et al., 2010). Hence, we fixed a32 = (8lbs/3.1lbs)(0.8 + 0.28)/2 ≈ 1.4.
Coho salmon are more productive than Herring at low densities, hence we chose
to lower salmon recruitment as much as “believably” possible so that the growth
rate in our salmon and herring fisheries matched. To do this, we assumed the
average survival probability of juvenile salmon was equal to the estimate for
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bad years (0.28). Therefore, with the composite parameter of recruitment at
low densities estimated in (Worden et al., 2010) of 60 juveniles per spawner, we
get a21b1 = (0.28)(60recruits/spawner)(spawner/8lbs)(3lbs/recruit) ≈ 6.6. We
chose a herring growth rate of 2.1 because 2.13 ≈ (6.6)(1.4). The growth rate
reported for herring population dynamics ranges from 1.4 − 1.8 (Bjørndal and
Conrad, 1987; Nostbakken and Bjorndal, 2003), so while our herring growth rate
is high, it is not unreasonably so. Carrying capacity is arbitrarily set to 5, 400
tons, which determines b2 for both models.
4.2.3 Optimal strategies and statistical analysis
We calculated optimal strategies using (Reed, 1979) for the unstructured model
and the results from Chapter 3 for the age structured model. For the parameters
in the game, the optimal escapement is 2049 tons of fish, in the unstructured game,
and 556 tons of adult fish in the age structured game.
The first goal of the experiments was to compare the performance of users
to fitted models playing the exact same instance of the game. As a control, we
compared both the fitted models’ and users’ performance to the net discounted
profit generated by the optimal constant escapement rule specified above (i.e. the
optimal strategy with perfect information).
For all fitted models, parameters were initially estimated using the data
generated from the users’ eight turn practice game. In the computer’s first turn
of the game, it harvests using the best escapement rule assuming these parameter
estimates are true. After observing the stock biomass resulting from its previous
harvest, it re-estimates the parameters using the previous data along with this new
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data point. It then chooses a new escapement rule based on the new parameter
estimates, and the process is continued until the game is over.
The parameter estimation for the unstructured game is performed by min-
imizing sum of squared errors between the log transformed recruitment data,
log [mt+1Bt+1], and log transformed predicted recruitment under the model,
log[R(mtBt−ht)], using the function lsqcurvefit, an implementation of the trust-
region-reflective algorithm, in MATLAB (MATLAB, 2010). For the age structured
game, since juvenile biomass is unobservable, the procedure is the same as above,
except predicted recruitment is a21R(m3,tB3,t − h3,t) and observed recruitment is
m2,t+2B2,t+2. The transition between immature and adult biomass is estimated
similarly.
We consider fitted models with the same functional form (Beverton-Holt
recruitment) as the model underlying the simulated population dynamics, and
in addition models that incorrectly specify the functional form (discrete logistic
and Ricker recruitment). For the age structure game we also consider devel-
oping escapement rules from an unstructured Beverton-Holt recruitment model
(as in (4.1)). To estimate the parameters for this model, the computer min-
imizes the sum squared error between the log transformed aggregate biomass
data, log[m2,t+1B2,t+1 +m3,t+1B3,t+1], and the predicted biomass, log[R(m2,tB2,t +
m3,tB3,t − h2,t − h3,t)]. It then harvests the two age classes in proportion to their
respective observed biomasses.
The second goal of the experiments was to analyze what strategies the users
were deploying and how well different strategies performed compared to others.
We compared the user’s behavior to three idealized candidate strategies, constant
harvest, proportional harvest and constant escapement. Constant harvest means
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the user enters the same harvest at every time step (harvest = β, where β is the
user’s mean harvest). Under a proportional harvest strategy the user harvests
a constant proportion of the biomass (harvest = β· biomass, where β is their
harvest proportion). Constant escapement, means the user lets a constant amount
of biomass escape harvest (harvest = 0 if biomass ≤ β, harvest = biomass −β
if biomass > β, where β is the biomass they let escape harvest). After fitting
these three models to the harvest vs. biomass data generated by each user during
their game play, the users were categorized into the three strategy classes based on
which model fit had the lowest sum squared error. For the age-structured game we
repeated the above analysis on adult harvest, for simplicity (since adult harvest is
optimal), but the results reported in the next section are similar if total harvest of
both age classes is used instead.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Unstructured population game
All human subjects achieved less discounted net profit than would be achieved us-
ing the optimal constant escapement strategy with known parameters (Fig. 4.3a).
The average human scored 65.4 percent of the discounted net profit generated using
the optimal constant escapement strategy, and 11.0 percent of humans achieved
over 90 percent of this optimal expected net profit.
Most users performed worse than the escapement rules generated from the
fitted models (Fig. 4.3bcd) even if the model made incorrect assumptions about
the underlying recruitment function (Fig. 4.3cd).
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Figure 4.3: The percent of the mathematical model’s total profit achieved by the
user, in the unstructured game, when the mathematical model is (a) Beverton-Holt
with true parameters, i.e. perfect information (b) Beverton-Holt but with parame-
ters estimated from the data, (c) discrete logistic with parameters estimated from
the data and (d) Ricker with parameters estimated from the data. For example
a value of 50 percent means the user generated half the profit the mathematical
model did managing the exact same instance of the game. A value of 200 percent
means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
When fitting a linear model, using lm in R (R Development Core Team,
2008), to test whether the percent of optimal profit achieved by the user was cor-
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related with the answers to the survey questions, standard deviation of environmen-
tal stochasticity, and net profit generated during the practice game, not including
the bonus, practice game profit was the only significant predictor 2 (p < 0.0001).
Doing a simple linear regression for the user’s percent optimal profit vs. practice
game score, the model explained 28 percent of the variation in the users optimal
profit, (R2 = 0.28, see Fig. 7.4 on pg. 124).
When the practice game predictor was removed from the linear model, the
user’s level of study (freshman, senior, PhD etc.), academic field of study, and
standard deviation of the observed environmental stochasticity, still did not signif-
icantly correlate with the user’s performance. Two predictors were significant in
this model. The five students that indicated “I am considering a career in fisheries
management, but have no experience” generated more profit than students that
responded “I am not considering a career in fisheries management” (p = 0.033)
and students in Cornell’s “Environmental Conservation” course scored significantly
higher than the students in Ithaca College’s “Principles of Biology” course (p =
0.041). However, a linear model with just these two predictor variables only ex-
plained four percent of the variation in user performance. It should also be noted
that if we grouped the two students that actually had fisheries management expe-
rience with those five students that indicated a career interest but no experience,
the answer to the management experience question would no longer significantly
correlate with the users’ scores. This suggests the sample size for students who
were considering careers in fisheries management may be too small to draw any
meaningful conclusions.
Classifying the humans’ harvest strategies into the three categories: con-
2Because the practice game is only 8 turns, the bonus is a very large proportion of the subject’s
practice game score. Therefore, including the bonus washes out the effect of the users’ strategies
over the course of the practice game.
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stant harvest, proportional harvest and constant escapement, people harvested a
constant proportion of the observed biomass (129 users) much more often than
allowing a constant amount of biomass escape harvest (30 users) (Fig. 4.4). Many
users repeated their harvest decision from the previous turn and the average user
only entered 10 unique harvest values over the course of the 21 turn game (Fig.
7.5 on pg. 125), but only 39 users were classified as constant harvesters. All five
users that indicated a career interest in fisheries management were classified as
proportional harvesters. Of the two users with actual management experience,
one was a constant harvester and the other was a proportional harvester.
Nearly an equal number of humans over-fished the population vs. under-
fished the population (Fig. 4.5a). If we define under-fishing as letting on average
more than (1 + q)S∗ fish escape harvest and overfishing as letting less than (1 −
q)S∗, fish escape harvest, where S∗ is optimal constant escapement under perfect
information, nearly an identical proportion of the humans are under-fishers as
over-fishers for all q < 0.6. For example, if q = .5, there were 66 over-fishers, 63
under-fishers, and 70 humans whose median escapement was within 50 percent of
the optimal value (Fig. 4.5a).
Students who used constant escapement strategies were more likely to over-
fish (circles in Fig. 4.5a). Proportional harvesters both over and under-fished
(triangles in Fig. 4.5a) and constant harvesters were much more likely to under-
fish (pluses in Fig. 4.5a). Note that constant harvesters really can only under-fish
because if they were to over-fish the biomass would eventually decrease to the point
where their constant harvest would deplete the fishery, at which point they would
have to abandon the constant harvest strategy.
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Figure 4.4: (a) the sum of squared error when fitting each user’s harvest data, in
the unstructured game, to a constant escapement model vs. fitting a proportional
harvest model on a log-log scale. Points to the right of the 1:1 line represent users
whose variation in harvest is better explained by constant escapement than propor-
tional harvest. (b-c) The harvest vs. observed biomass for a user (highlighted with
a blue triangle in a) deploying a proportional harvest strategy (b) and a constant
escapement strategy (c).
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Figure 4.5: (a) The profit generated by each user, in the unstructured game, rela-
tive to the net profit the optimal strategy with perfect information would generate
in the corresponding instance of the game, as a function of the average amount of
fish the user let escape harvest. The red circles, blue triangles and green pluses
are for users who used constant escapement (CE), proportional harvest (PH), and
constant harvest (CH) strategies, respectively. (b) the analogous proportion of
optimal profit generated by the fitted model vs. the median of escapements chosen
by the model after it fit a recruitment function to the data during each turn of the
game. The dotted line is optimal escapement strategy under perfect information.
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Poorly performing harvest rules generated by the fitted Beverton-Holt re-
cruitment model were much more often due to overfishing than under-fishing (Fig.
4.5b). Poor model performance was due to two reasons: (1) during the practice
game the user allowed similar amounts of biomass to escape harvest on every turn,
generating poor data for model fitting, and (2) the standard deviation of the envi-
ronmental noise was high (Fig. 4.6). When these conditions are true the data can
misrepresent the recruitment function (Fig. 4.6b compared to 4.6c) and lead to a
poor escapement strategy. Despite the poor escapement strategies that sometimes
resulted from the fitted models, they still were less frequent and generated more
long term discounted profit than the worse users (compare the low points in Fig.
4.5a to 4.5b).
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Figure 4.6: (a) The profit generated from the strategies using the fitted Beverton-
Holt model relative to the optimal profit under perfect information, as a function
of the standard deviation in practice game escapement, generated by the user.
Dark and light circles are for instances of the games with low and high levels
of environmental stochasticity respectively. (b-c) The true recruitment function
(dashed line) and fitted recruitment function (solid line) for two instances of the
game, [these examples are highlighted by a red circle and blue triangle in (a)],
where the fitted model generates unprofitable escapement strategies (b - red circle)
and profitable ones (c - blue triangle). The open symbols are recruitment data
generated by the user in the practice game, while the smaller filled points are
generated by the fitted model when playing the actual game.
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4.3.2 Age structured population game
In the age structured model, the average user achieved 63.6 percent of the optimal
profit achieved by a model with perfect information. The most profitable user
scored only 84.3 percent of the optimal profit, in comparison to the best performer
in the one dimensional game who scored over 95 percent of optimal profit. On the
opposite end of the spectrum the worst users in the one dimensional game only
scored 7.2 percent of optimal profit while in the age structured game the worst user
scored 11.8 percent of optimal profit. A full distribution of the relative performance
of the users compared to the optimal policy in the age structured game is given in
Fig. 4.7. The reason for the improved performance by the worse players, despite
the age-structured game being more complex, was due to the fact that this game
includes three independent cohorts. Even if one or two cohorts were driven to low
levels, some harvest could be achieved in the remaining turns as long as one cohort
remained. A player could make one very bad decision, and learn from it, without
collapsing the entire fishery.
The user’s performance in the age structured game was mainly determined
by their overall fishing pressure and not their decision of which age class to fish
(compare Fig. 4.8a to 4.8b). The majority of users harvested more immature
biomass than adult biomass, despite exclusive adult harvest being the optimal
strategy (4.8b). Similar to the simple unstructured, one dimensional game, users
who deployed a constant escapement strategy (for adults) were more likely to
over-fish (4.8a).
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Figure 4.7: The percent of the mathematical model’s total profit achieved by
the user, in the age structured game, when the mathematical model is (a) age
structured with true parameters, i.e. perfect information (b) age structured but
with parameters estimated from the data, and (c) unstructured with parameters
estimated from the aggregated (immature + adult) biomass data. For example
a value of 50 percent means the user generated half the profit the mathematical
model did, managing the exact same instance of the game. A value of 200 percent
means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
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Figure 4.8: (ac) The proportion of optimal profit, in the age structured game,
generated by the (a) user and (c) fitted unstructured model for each game as
a function of the average escapement chosen. (bd) The proportion of optimal
profit generated by the (b) user and (d) fitted unstructured model as a function
of the average proportion of harvest allocated to adult biomass during the game.
The red lines represent the percent of optimal profit we would expect to generate
using a constant escapement strategy (s˜ in equation (4.4)), assuming deterministic
population dynamics.
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The average escapement strategies resulting from the fitted age structure
model achieved 98.4 percent of the optimal profit, even better than in the unstruc-
tured game. Even in the fitted model’s lowest performing game, it achieved 78.9
percent of optimal discounted net profit, far better than even the median user.
This is for two reasons (1) users in the practice game tended not to let the same
amount of adult fish escape harvest every turn, producing good data for model
fitting, and (2) the transition rate from immatures to adults was always estimated
well, because it is a single parameter that can be estimated independently from re-
cruitment, while the recruitment function requires two parameters to be estimated
simultaneously. The result of point (2) is that the models always fished from the
correct age class.
The average escapement strategy, generated by fitting a one dimensional un-
structured population model to the aggregate age-structured data, achieved 72.3
percent of the optimal profit. This represents a 13.5 percent gain in profit over
the average human operating solely on intuition. Only 58 users, out of 172, gener-
ated more profit than would have been obtained by harvesting based on the fitted
unstructured model. However, for instances of the game where the unstructured
model generated low discounted net profit, the model’s proposed escapement rule
nearly wiped out the fishery, by letting very little biomass escape harvest. These
strategies generated less discounted net profit than the least profitable users (com-
pare the lowest points in Fig. 4.8a to 4.8c).
In Fig. 4.8d there is a correlation between the proportion of harvest from
the adult class and total profit, despite the fact that the fitted one dimensional
escapement strategy harvests from the adult and immature classes proportionally
according to their biomass. To see why, consider a deterministic version of the
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age structured population dynamics, and assume the manager always allows s˜
total biomass to escape harvest, targeting each age class proportional to it’s corre-
sponding biomass. In addition, assume s˜ is smaller than the equilibrium biomass
under no harvest, so that the dynamics do not allow for letting more biomass
escape than is present at equilibrium. Then the dynamics are,
B1,t+1 = R(s˜rt)
B2,t+1 = a21B1,t
B3,t+1 = a32s˜(1− rt).
(4.4)
where rt ≡ B3,t/(B3,t+B2,t), is the biomass ratio in year t. Note that with harvest
proportional to the respective age classes, the biomass ratio is equivalent to the
ratio of adults harvested and also the ratio of adult biomass that escapes harvest.
At equilibrium, rt+1 = rt ≡ r, is the solution to
r =
a32s˜(1− r)
a21R(s˜) + a32s˜(1− r) . (4.5)
For Beverton-Holt recruitment, r is the root in [0, 1] of the cubic polynomial,
[b2s˜] r
3 +
[
1− 2b2s˜− a21
a32
b1
]
r2 + [b2s˜− 2]r + 1. (4.6)
When fishing pressure is low (i.e. in the limit as s˜ → 0) the cubic term becomes
negligible and therefore,
r =
a32(1−
√
a32a21b1)
a32 − a21b1 . (4.7)
99
When there is no fishing pressure,
r = a32/(a32 + 1) (4.8)
Substituting the parameters from the game into the above formulas, 32 percent of
harvested biomass is from the adult class when fishing pressure is high (from equa-
tion (4.7), low escapement), and 58 percent of total harvest is from adult biomass
under almost no fishing pressure (from equation (4.8), high escapement). This
makes sense, since under high fishing pressure low adult biomass leads to greater
per capita recruitment and hence the fishery is dominated by immatures. These
calculations match the range of adult harvest proportions observed in Fig. 4.8d,
since the minimum harvest value in the plot is the minimum harvest proportion
we calculated under high fishing pressure, 32 percent. Note that in this game it
is always optimal to harvest adults, due to a high value of a32 and a low discount
rate. Therefore, the fact that profit is not monotonically increasing with the allo-
cation of harvest to the more valuable adult class, Fig. 4.8d, means the choice of
escapement is the main driver of profit, not the resulting proportion of harvested
biomass allocated towards adults, r.
Generating the full range of possible escapement values, zero to the total
biomass under no harvest, and calculating corresponding proportion of optimal
harvest using (4.4), gives the red curve in Fig. 4.8c. In addition we can calculate
the corresponding r for each escapement value, numerically, using (4.6), which gives
the red curve in figure 4.8d. This shows that r only explains the profits generated
by the fitted unstructured model through its correlation with total escapement, not
because the harvest proportion, resulting from the unstructured model, explicitly
predicts profit.
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4.4 Discussion
Many mathematical tools exist to improve decision making in environmental man-
agement, including methods from optimization and optimal control. Yet managers
are still resistant to using these tools to develop management plans. At least one
reason for this is that it is often unclear what a manager may gain by using quan-
titative methods, especially if the dynamics of the managed system are not well
understood.
In this chapter we looked at optimal escapement strategies for the manage-
ment of simulated fisheries, developed using highly simplified models of fish stock
dynamics, and tested their performance compared to humans managing the simu-
lated population using only their experience and judgment. The models, performed
better than the users, on average, even when the models mis-specified recruitment
or state variables. However, in the age structured game, the worst outcomes pro-
duced by the simplified unstructured model were worse than the worst outcomes
generated by the users.
Users and fitted models tended to make different types of mistakes. An
equal number of users overfished vs. underfished the stock. However, when the
models failed it was almost always due to overfishing.
We found that even when the model is perfectly specified, and only needs
to fit parameters from the data, it still can perform worse than a human us-
ing intuition alone, especially when environmental stochasticity is high and prior
management decisions have all been similar. This suggests that passive adaptive
management, choosing the best strategy, based on the current knowledge of the
system, to optimize some objective, without any regards to the information gained
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by deploying that action (Williams, 2001), can lead to poor performance. This
problem is likely common in fisheries management, since overexploited fisheries
are ubiquitous, and therefore the time series data of fish stock abundances may
often contain only population sizes well below carrying capacity. In such cases,
recruitment curves may often be incorrectly estimated and our simple models will
naively suggest that it is optimal to keep overfishing.
Our results suggest that probing the system by performing an action that
is suboptimal given the manager’s current belief about the system, but that will
reveal information that improves management in the future might be ideal in such
scenarios. Incorporating the economic benefits of learning from experimentation
explicitly into the optimal decision problem, known as active adaptive manage-
ment, has been studied within the context of harvested populations. However,
due to computational limitations solutions are always limited to cases with one
of the three following assumptions: (1) both the probability distribution specify-
ing environmental stochasticity and all parameters in the recruitment function are
perfectly known, except for a single parameter to be estimated from the data (Wal-
ters, 1981; Ludwig and Walters, 1982), (2) there is a small number of candidate
models, with all parameters fixed within each model (Williams, 2001), or (3) only
a small number of actions and system states are admissible (i.e. action = harvest
or not, fishery state = robust, vulnerable, or collapsed, Hauser and Possingham,
2008).
Unfortunately, the problem of choosing an optimal escapement level in our
game, using the principles of active adaptive management, is computationally in-
feasible given current algorithms and computing power because our game allows
for an infinite set of possible actions and states, governed by unknown parameters
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and unknown variability in environmental noise.
It is rather alarming that even in the most optimistic case, where the un-
derlying dynamic model is known and parameters have to be estimated from the
data, passive adaptive management can fail to achieve desirable results. However,
the alternative of letting humans manage our simulated fishery based solely on
their experience and judgment typically led to much worse outcomes. Because
mathematical models usually improved management outcomes in our experiment,
we would recommend modeling be more widely adopted in management. However,
models should not be considered as a replacement for manager expertise. Our re-
sults show that in some cases human intervention will be required when models
appear to recommend risky management decisions.
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CHAPTER 5
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER TWO
5.1 Appendix A: Mathematical analysis
Since A(t) +U(t) +D(t) +O(t) = 1, it suffices to study the 3-dimensional system
dx(t)
dt
= g(x(t), s(t)) (5.1)
where x(t) = (U(t), D(t), O(t)) and
g(x, s) =

α− (α + ess+ 1)U + (γ − α)O − γOU − γO2
ess(t)U − edD −D
U − eoO
 (5.2)
with A(t) = 1−U(t)−D(t)−O(t). The goal is to find the sampling strategy, s(t)
that minimizes the objective function:
J =
∫ T
0
e−δt [ kuU + koO + kdD + f(s)(A+ U) ] dt. (5.3)
Define the set of all admissible sampling strategies as
S = {s(t) | s : [0, T ]→ [0, smax] is Lebesgue measurable}.
Because the set of all Lebesgue measurable functions is a vector space, and [0, smax]
is convex, S is convex.
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Lemma 5.1. g(x, s) is Lipschitz continuous in s ∈ [0, smax] and Lipschitz contin-
uous in x ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Proof. The first part follows from g being linear in s and the second part follows
from g being continuously differentiable for all x in the compact set [0, 1]× [0, 1]×
[0, 1].
Theorem 5.1. Given the objective functional (5.3), subject to the constraint (5.2),
there exists an s∗(t) ∈ S, such that J(s∗(t)) = min {J(s(t)) | s(t) ∈ S}.
Proof. By definition, the integrand of (5.3) is convex on the convex, closed control
set S. The state equations in (5.1) are linear in the control variables. By lemma
5.1, equation (5.1) is bounded by a linear system in the state variables. Therefore
by theorem 4.1 in (Fleming and Rishel, 1975) we have the desired result.
Theorem 5.2. Given the optimal sampling effort, s∗(t), and the corresponding
solution to the dynamic equations (5.2), there exists adjoint variables λu, λd and
λo satisfying
dλu
dt
= −∂H
∂U
+ δλu = −ku + (α + ess+ 1 + γO + δ)λu − essλd − λo
dλd
dt
= −∂H
∂D
+ δλd = −kd + f(s) + (α + γO)λu + (ed + 1 + δ)λd − λo
dλo
dt
= −∂H
∂O
+ δλo = −ko + f(s) + (α + γU + γD + 2γO − γ)λu + (eo + δ)λo
λi(T ) = 0, for i ∈ {u, d, o}.
(5.4)
Where H is the current value Hamiltonian:
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H(U,O, s, λu, λo) = kuU + koO + kdD + f(s)(1−D −O)
+ λu(α− (α + ess+ 1)U + (γ − α)O − γOU − γO2)
+ λd(essU − (ed + 1)D)
+ λo(D + U − eoO).
(5.5)
In addition,
s∗(t) =

0 : s¯(t) ≤ 0
s¯(t) : 0 < s¯(t) < smax
smax : s¯(t) ≥ smax
. (5.6)
where
s¯(t) =
esU(t)[λu(t)− λd(t)]
2[1−D(t)−O(t)] −
ks
2
.
Proof. A version of Pontryagin’s minimum principle for bounded controls (Lenhart
and Workman, 2007) gives the existence of adjoint variables satisfying (5.4) and
the following characterization of the control

s∗(t) = 0 : ∂H
∂s
≥ 0
0 < s∗(t) < smax : ∂H∂s = 0
s∗(t) = smax : ∂H∂s ≤ 0
. (5.7)
Since
∂H
∂s
= (ks + 2s)(1−D −O) + esUλd − esUλu,
(5.6) follows.
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A mathematically equivalent formulation of (5.2) exists, using a discounted
Hamiltonian and discounted shadow prices, where the first line of (5.5) would be
multiplied by e−δt and the adjoint equations would not include δλ terms. In such a
case λu(t) is the amount of money a manager would be willing to pay at time zero to
reduce Undetected patches at time t by a small amount. We chose the formulation
where the adjoint variables are interpreted as the amount the manager would pay
at time t rather than at time zero.
Lemma 5.2. The integrand in equation (5.3) and the right hand side of equation
(5.4) are Lipschitz continuous in the state and adjoint variables.
Proof. This follows from their linearity in the state and adjoint variables.
Theorem 5.3. The solution to the optimality system is unique for a sufficiently
small final time T
Proof. Follows from lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, and theorem 2.3 in (Joshi et al., 2006).
5.1.1 Interpretation of the optimal sampling policy
Theorem (5.2) characterizes the optimal sampling policy by introducing “adjoint
variables,” λu(t) and λo(t), the amount a manager would be willing to pay for a
small decrease in the proportion of Undetected and Outbreak patches, at time t,
respectively. To make sense of (5.6) note that λu(t) − λd(t) is the cost benefit of
eradicating a small proportion of Undetected patches and U(t)/[1 −D(t) − O(t)]
is the proportion of patches available for sampling that are infected. So equation
(5.6) is just 1/2 times the per unit cost benefit of increasing sampling a small
amount.
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From the first equation in (5.4), the amount the manager is willing to pay
decreases as the end of the management period approaches, and is highest in cases
where the cost of damage in Undetected patches, ku, and outbreak patches, ko, is
high. Naively, one might conclude from (5.6), that optimal sampling effort should
increase with increased efficacy and decrease when sampling is costly or when there
are many absent patches that must be sampled. However, this cannot be concluded
directly from the equations due to how es, ks, and U(t) affect the adjoint equations
in (5.4). Therefore, we must use numerical methods to analyze how most of the
parameters affect optimal sampling effort.
5.1.2 Numerical methods
The solutions to the state and adjoint equations must be found numerically. To
do so, we use the forward backward sweep method (Lenhart and Workman, 2007),
which consists of the following steps:
1. Guess an initial sampling strategy, s(t).
2. Solve the initial value problem, equation (5.2), forward in time, given this
sampling strategy.
3. Solve the final value problem, equation (5.4), backwards in time, using U(t),
D(t) and O(t) generated from step (2).
4. Calculate the optimal sampling strategy, s∗(t), using equation. (5.6), given
λu(t), λd(t), λo(t), U(t), D(t) and O(t) calculated above.
5. Update the sampling strategy as sˆ(t) = ps∗(t) + (1− p)s(t) with 0 < p ≤ 1.
6. Set s(t) = sˆ(t) and repeat steps 2-5 until s(t) and sˆ(t) converge.
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For many parameter combinations, especially for  small, this method does not
converge. In such cases, we used hill climbing instead of solving for s∗(t) directly
as in step (4). This can be achieved by replacing steps (4) and (5) with the update:
sˆ = s(t)− q ∂H/∂s, where q = 0.005. This method is slower, but converged for all
parameter combinations tested. For several parameter combinations increasing q
improves speed with no sacrifice to convergence.
5.1.3 Equilibrium and constant strategies
Optimal constant strategies were generated numerically using “optimize” in R,
which uses a combination of golden section search and successive parabolic inter-
polation.
Equilibrium strategies were generated by solving for the optimal equilib-
rium that minimized long term cost. While equilibrium Undetected, Detected and
Outbreak patch proportion, given sampling effort, s, can be calculated analytically,
the equilibrium of the full seven dimensional system where the shadow prices, λu,
λd and λo, are also at equilibrium is not tractable. Therefore, we solve for the
equilibrium of equations (5.2) and (5.4) numerically using “rootSolve” in R, an
implementation of the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
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5.2 Appendix B: Parameterization for the eradication of
Gypsy Moth
While our model does not explicitly consider patch size, we use the size of gypsy
moth infestations on the west coast of the United States to estimate the parameters
in our model. To do this we start with parameters defined in the literature and
rescale them appropriately to match our continuous time formulation of sampling,
eradication, and cost (see table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Known gypsy moth parameters from the literature that we rescaled to
parameterize our model
Symbol Description Value Source
τ Average time it takes for an undetected patch
to become an outbreak
13 years eq. (5.9), using Epanchin-
Niell et al. (2012)
τe Average time it takes to eradicate an outbreak 4 years Lane County Oregon erad-
ication
a Patch area 930 km2 Lane County Oregon erad-
ication
au Mean treatment area of undetected infesta-
tions
6.1 km2 Washington State Eradi-
cation Program
κd Cost of damage by gypsy moth per year per
km2
380 USD Sharov and Liebhold
(1998)
κc Cost of deploying pesticide per km
2 6965 USD Mayo et al. (2003)
κs Cost of deploying one trap per year 49.67 USD Mayo et al. (2003)
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Calculating sampling parameters: Consider a landscape of n patches, each
patch with area a km2. Let the size of an infestation in Undetected and Detected
patches be denoted as au km
2 and let τ denote the average amount of time it takes
for an Undetected or Detected patch to become an outbreak. Note that τ comes
from how time is rescaled in the model. We assume that the probability that a
single trap detects an infestation in one year equals the proportion of the total
area of the patch that is occupied by the pest. This leads to
es =
auτ
a
. (5.8)
To estimate a, au and τ we use data from gypsy moth infestations on the west
coast of the United States. The largest gypsy moth infestation ever successfully
eradicated was a 930 km2 region located in Lane County, Oregon. Therefore, we
define a patch to be a region of area, a = 930 km2, and assume the pest population
in an Outbreak fully occupies the patch.
Since 1988 Washington state has eradicated several small isolated popu-
lations (agr.wa.gov/PlantsInsects/InsectPests/GypsyMoth). The mean treatment
area of these infestations is 6.1 km2. We assume this is the average size of a gypsy
moth infestation in an Undetected patch, au.
To calculate τ , we use the model described by Epanchin-Niell et al. (2012).
They described the total area cover (AC) of a t year old infestation in km2 as
AC(t) = pi
(
t∑
i=1
1.5i5
25 + i5
)2
. (5.9)
This model assumes radial spread with a sigmoidal density dependent spread rate,
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to account for an Allee effect. Using equation (5.9) it takes 13 years to reach
a size of 472 km2, which is approximately the largest infestation in Washington
state that was successfully eradicated in two treatments or less. Therefore, we let
τ = 13 years be the average time it takes for an Undetected patch to transition
into an Outbreak. With a,au and τ described above, es = 0.0857 traps
−1. Note in
unscaled time, es corresponds to a trapping efficacy of 0.0066 detections per trap
per year.
We set the maximum sampling effort to be such that on average it takes
two weeks to detect the presence of the invasive in an Undetected patch. Given
there is 52.2 weeks in a year, we have
smax =
26.1 τ
es
= 3960 traps (5.10)
Calculating eradication rates: Let τe be the average amount of time in years
it takes to eradicate an Outbreak when treatment is being deployed continuously
at a rate of one treatment per year. Then,
eo =
τ
τe
. (5.11)
Detected patches are eradicated at rate ed, where non-immediate eradication is due
to delays in deployment rather than failed eradication attempts. If τd the average
amount of time in years it takes to eradicate a Detected patch then
ed =
τ
τd
. (5.12)
112
It took 4 years of pesticide treatments, from 1985 to 1988, to eradicate the Out-
break in Lane county Oregon and therefore we let τe = 4 years, meaning eo = 3.25.
We vary τd in our study, but assume it is greater than 6 months and less than τe.
As a baseline we set it equal to one year, giving ed = 13.
Calculating cost parameters: Let κd be the cost of tree defoliation per km
2
of gypsy moth infestation per year, κc be the cost of deploying a single pesticide
treatment per km2 and κs be the cost of deploying and monitoring each trap per
year. Then
ku = κdauτ
ko = κdaτ + κcaτ
ks = κsτ
kd = κdauτ + edκcau.
(5.13)
Damage due to defoliation is κd = 380 USD as estimated in (Sharov and Lieb-
hold, 1998). The cost of deploying an eradication treatment is set to κc = 6, 965
USD per km2 as estimated in (Mayo et al., 2003). Trap cost is set at κs = 49.67
USD per trap per year, as estimated in (Mayo et al., 2003). This leads to pa-
rameters ku = 30.3 thousand USD · patch−1, ko = 88.8 million USD · patch−1, kd =
582.5 thousand USD · patch−1, and ks = 646 USD · trap−1 · patch−1.
In the above formulation, the cost of eradicating Outbreaks looks differ-
ent than the cost of eradicating Detected patches. This is because delays in the
eradication of Detected patches are assumed to be due to political or management
delays and not failed eradication attempts. We assume there is no direct cost to
waiting to eradicate a Detected patch. Therefore, the cost of eradicating Detected
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patches is just the cost of applying treatment times the number of eradications. For
an Outbreak patch, treatment costs accumulate from failed eradication attempts
over the entire timespan prior to successful eradication.
We assume that  = 0.01 so that quadratic sampling cost is negligible com-
pared to linear sampling costs for all trap densities.
Initial Conditions: Washington state is 184, 827 km2, corresponding to approxi-
mately n = 200 patches in our model. During the first five years of their eradication
program, starting in 1979, seven pesticide treatments were applied at four sepa-
rate locations in King County, while smaller isolated treatments were applied in
Clark, Pierce and Snohomish counties. Hence, we assumed an initial prevalence of
one Outbreak patch and three Undetected patches, yielding initial conditions of
U(0) = 0.015, and O(0) = 0.005.
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5.3 Appendix C: Supplementary figures
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Figure 5.1: (a) How many times more costly it is to deploy the constant strategy
over the intense early sampling strategy as a function of ku, when varying ks,
ko, kd and ku simultaneously using latin hypercube sampling. Note that ku does
not explain any of the variation in the relative cost benefit of using intense early
sampling. (b) How many times more costly it is to deploy the constant strategy
over the intense early sampling strategy as a function of kd, when varying ks,
ko, kd and ku simultaneously using latin hypercube sampling. Note that kd does
not explain any of the variation in the relative cost benefit of using intense early
sampling. (c) How many times more costly it is to deploy the constant strategy
over the intense early sampling strategy as a function of the base 10 logarithm of
the ratio of sampling cost to Outbreak cost, i.e. how many orders of magnitude
smaller ks is than ko. Other parameters are α = 0.0005, γ = 2, es = 0.087, eo =
3.25,  = 0.01, δ = 0.13, smax = 3960
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Figure 5.2: (a) Optimal per-patch sampling effort vs. time when the invader is
initially absent. (b) The corresponding dynamics of the proportion of Undetected
patches. (c) Optimal per-patch sampling effort vs. time when the invader is
initially present but sampling efficacy is very low, es = 0.002.
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CHAPTER 6
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER THREE
6.1 Validation of analytical results
To confirm that the escapement rules produced in the deterministic analysis is in
fact producing the best constant escapement policy, we compared our analytic solu-
tions to the best escapement strategies found via numerical optimization, when the
initial conditions are set to the equilibrium biomass. When δ < δcrit, the numeric
solutions converged to a strategy of form (σ = σ∗, η = 0) as in (3.22), when δ > δcrit
and a31R(σ
∗)/(1− a11) < (1− a33)σ∗, the numerics converged to a (h = 0, s = s∗)
strategy as in (3.35), and when δ > δcrit and a31R(σ
∗)/(1−a11) ≥ (1−a33)σ∗, they
converged to (σ = σˆ∗, s = 0) as in (3.40) (figure 6.1). In these plots the discounted
net revenue generated by our analytic solutions are compared to the revenue from
the numerical optimal escapement strategy for 2000 parameter combinations, cal-
culated using “optim”, an implementation of the Nelder Mead simplex method in
R (R Development Core Team, 2008), with stage structure transition parameters
and discount rates generated uniform randomly with a Beverton-Holt recruitment
function.
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Figure 6.1: Plots of net revenue, relative to optimal net revenue, for a vari-
ety of harvesting strategies and conditions on the parameters. 2,000 parameter
values were uniformly randomly generated over the domains a32, a21 ∈ (0, 2),
a11, a22, a33 ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 0.1), throwing out any parameter combination not
satisfying proposition 3.1. (a) Net revenue, relative to optimal net revenue, when
harvesting no immatures and letting σ∗ units of adult biomass escape. The numer-
ical results here confirm the prediction that when [a32 + a22 > 1 + δ; black circles]
harvesting no immatures and letting σ∗ adult biomass escape achieves the optimal
revenue while not for other parameter combinations [a32 + a22 < 1 + δ; red x’s and
blue triangles]. (b) Net revenue, relative to optimal net revenue, when harvesting
no adults and letting s∗ units of immature biomass escape, The numerical results
here show that when [a32 + a22 < 1 + δ and a31R(σ
∗)/(1− a11) < (1− a33)σ∗; red
x’s] this strategy is optimal. (c) net revenue, relative to optimal net revenue, when
harvesting all immature fish and letting σˆ∗ adults escape. This strategy is optimal
when [a32 +a22 < 1+δ and a31R(σ
∗)/(1−a11) > (1−a33)σ∗; blue triangles]. Other
parameters are b1 = 3.25 and b2 = 0.00234.
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CHAPTER 7
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER FOUR
7.1 Survey
Below is a copy of the survey.
How many times have you played this game before?
• possible answers: “0”,“1”, “2”,... “15”, “more than 15”, “I’ve only played a
different version of this game”
What best describes your education level?
• possible answers: “No college”, “Some college or associates degree, but not
currently in college”, “Freshman (1st year)”, “Sophomore (2nd year)”, “Ju-
nior (3rd year)”, “Senior (4th year or greater)”, “completed Bachelor’s de-
gree”, “In PhD, MS, MA, or MEng program”, “In other post-bachelor pro-
gram (e.g. JD, MBA, MD, MFA)”, “completed MS, MA, or MEng degree”,
“completed PhD degree”, “completed other post-bachelor degree (e.g. JD,
MBA, MD, MFA)”
What best describes the field of study for your highest degree?
• possible answers: “No college”, “Math, Statistics, or Computation”,“ Ecol-
ogy, Natural Resources, or Environmental Biology”, “Economics”, “Political
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Science or Government”,“ Environmental Engineering”, “Other Engineer-
ing”, “Other Biology”, “Physical Sciences”, “Social Sciences”, “Humanities,
“undecided”
What best describes your experience fishing?
• possible answers: “I have never fished”,“I fish or have fished, but less than
once per year”, “I fish recreationally, at least once per year, but not for a
living”, “I fish or have fished for a living”
What best describes your experience managing fisheries?
• possible answers: “I have work/intern experience managing fisheries, more
than 10 years”, “I have work/intern experience managing fisheries, between
10 and 2 years”, “I have work/intern experience managing fisheries, less than
2 years”, “ I am considering a career in fisheries management, but have no
experience”, “ I am not considering a career in fisheries management”
Do you have work experience managing any (non-human) biological population
outside of fisheries?
• possible answers: “I have work/intern experience managing game (hunted
populations)”, “I have work/intern experience in conservation biology”, “I
have work/intern experience in forestry”, “I have work/intern experience in
agricultural management”, “I have work/intern experience managing other
biological populations”, “I am considering careers in managing biological
populations, but have no experience”, “I am not considering careers in man-
aging biological populations”
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7.2 Game directions
Figure 7.1: Directions for unstructured herring fish game.
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Figure 7.2: Directions for age structured salmon fish game.
7.3 Supplementary figures
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Figure 7.3: A histogram of percent of optimal profit achieved by the users for each
class. Note the histograms are overlaid rather than stacked.
123
(a)
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
G
am
e 
pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
Practice game performance
(b)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
G
am
e 
pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
Practice game performance
Figure 7.4: Proportion of optimal profit generated by the user in the actual game
vs. Proportion of optimal profit generated by the user in the practice, not including
the bonus, for (a) the one dimensional game and (b) the age structured game.
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Figure 7.5: (a) A histogram of the number of times the user entered same harvest
value as they did on the previous turn. (b) A histogram of the number of unique
harvest entries they made over the course of the entire game.
125
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, W., W. Keith, F. Mills, M. Bailey, and J. Steimneyer (1978). A survey
of south carolina’s hard clam resources. Technical Report 32, South Carolina
Wildlife and Marine Resources Department, Marine Resources Center.
Beddington, J. R. and D. B. Taylor (1973). Optimum age specific harvesting of a
population. Biometrics 29 (4), pp. 801–809.
Bellman, R. (1952). On the theory of dynamic programming. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 38 (8), 716.
Bellman, R. (1954). Dynamic programming and a new formalism in the calculus
of variations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 40 (4), 231.
Bergh, M. O. and S. J. Johnston (1992). A size-structured model for renewable
resource management, with application to resources of rock lobster in the south-
east atlantic. South African Journal of Marine Science 12 (1), 1005–1016.
Bjørndal, T. and J. M. Conrad (1987). The dynamics of an open access fishery.
Canadian Journal of Economics , 74–85.
Bogich, T. L., A. M. Liebhold, and K. Shea (2008). To sample or eradicate? a cost
minimization model for monitoring and managing an invasive species. Journal
of Applied Ecology 45 (4), 1134–1142.
Botsford, L. (1981). Optimal fishery policy for size-specific, density-dependent
population models. Journal of Mathematical Biology 12 (3), 265–293.
126
Bricelj, V., R. Malouf, et al. (1980). Aspects of reproduction of hard clams (mer-
cenaria mercenaria) in great south bay, new york. In Proceedings of the National
Shellfisheries Association, Volume 70, pp. 216–229.
Busoni, G. and S. Matucci (1997). A problem of optimal harvesting policy in
two-stage age-dependent populations. Mathematical Biosciences 143 (1), 1 – 33.
Carriker, M. (1961). Interrelation of functional morphology, behavior, and au-
toecology in early stages of the bivalve, mercenaria mercenaria. Journal of the
Elisha Mitchell Scientific Society 77, 168–241.
Clark, C. (2010). Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Mathematics of Conserva-
tion. Pure and Applied Mathematics: A Wiley Series of Texts, Monographs and
Tracts. John Wiley & Sons.
Clark, C., G. Edwards, and M. Friedlaender (1973). Beverton-holt model of
a commercial fishery: optimal dynamics. Journal of the Fisheries Board of
Canada 30 (11), 1629–1640.
Connell, R. (1983). Seasonal mortality and population dynamics of juvenile hard
clams, Mercenaria mercenaria L., on an intertial mudflat in new jersey. Master’s
thesis, Rutgers University.
Conrad, J. M. (1982). Management of a multiple cohort fishery: The hard clam in
great south bay. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64 (3), 463–474.
Da Rocha, J.-M., M.-J. Gutie´rrez, and L. T. Antelo (2013). Selectivity, pulse
fishing and endogenous lifespan in beverton-holt models. Environmental and
Resource Economics 54 (1), 139–154.
Davis, M. A. (2009). Invasion biology. New York: Oxford University Press.
127
De Leo, G. A. and M. Gatto (2001). A stochastic bioeconomic analysis of silver
eel fisheries. Ecological Applications 11 (1), 281–294.
Deriso, R. B. (1999). Quantitative fish dynamics. Biological resource management
series. Oxford University Press, USA.
Diekert, F. K., D. Ø. Hjermann, E. Nævdal, and N. C. Stenseth (2010). Spare the
young fish: optimal harvesting policies for north-east arctic cod. Environmental
and Resource Economics 47 (4), 455–475.
Dixit, A. K. (1990). Optimization in economic theory, Volume 2. Oxford University
Press Oxford.
Epanchin-Niell, R. S., E. G. Brockerhoff, J. M. Kean, and J. Turner (2014). Design-
ing cost-efficient surveillance for early detection and control of multiple biological
invaders. Ecological Applications 24 (6), 1258–1274.
Epanchin-Niell, R. S., R. G. Haight, L. Berec, J. M. Kean, and A. M. Liebhold
(2012). Optimal surveillance and eradication of invasive species in heterogeneous
landscapes. Ecology letters 15 (8), 803–812.
Epanchin-Niell, R. S. and A. Hastings (2010). Controlling established invaders:
integrating economics and spread dynamics to determine optimal management.
Ecology Letters 13 (4), 528–541.
Fegley, S. R. (2001). Demography and dynamics of hard clam populations. Devel-
opments in Aquaculture and Fisheries Science 31, 383–422.
Fleming, W. H. and R. W. Rishel (1975). Deterministic and stochastic optimal
control, Volume 1. Springer New York.
128
Gerber, L. R., M. Beger, M. A. McCarthy, and H. P. Possingham (2005). A theory
for optimal monitoring of marine reserves. Ecology Letters 8 (8), 829–837.
Getz, W. M. (1980). The ultimate-sustainable-yield problem in nonlinear age-
structured populations. Mathematical Biosciences 48 (3-4), 279 – 292.
Getz, W. M. and R. G. Haight (1989). Population harvesting: demographic models
of fish, forest, and animal resources, Volume 27. Princeton University Press.
Gurtin, M. E. and L. F. Murphy (1981). On the optimal harvesting of age-
structured populations: Some simple models. Mathematical Biosciences 55 (1 -
2), 115 – 136.
Haack, R. A., F. He´rard, J. Sun, and J. J. Turgeon (2010). Managing invasive
populations of asian longhorned beetle and citrus longhorned beetle: a worldwide
perspective. Annual Review of Entomology 55, 521–546.
Haight, R. G. and S. Polasky (2010). Optimal control of an invasive species with
imperfect information about the level of infestation. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics 32 (4), 519–533.
Haskin, H. H. (1954). Age determination in molluscs. Transactions of the New
York Academy of Sciences 16 (6 Series II), 300–304.
Hauser, C. E. and M. A. McCarthy (2009). Streamlining ‘search and destroy’: cost-
effective surveillance for invasive species management. Ecology Letters 12 (7),
683–692.
Hauser, C. E. and H. P. Possingham (2008). Experimental or precautionary?
adaptive management over a range of time horizons. Journal of Applied Ecol-
ogy 45 (1), 72–81.
129
Hobbs, R. J. and S. E. Humphries (1995). An integrated approach to the ecology
and management of plant invasions. Conservation Biology 9 (4), pp. 761–770.
Homans, F. and T. Horie (2011). Optimal detection strategies for an established
invasive pest. Ecological Economics 70 (6), 1129–1138.
Horie, T., R. G. Haight, F. R. Homans, and R. C. Venette (2013). Optimal
strategies for the surveillance and control of forest pathogens: A case study
with oak wilt. Ecological Economics 86, 78–85.
Jing, W. and W. Ke (2004). The optimal harvesting problems of a stage-structured
population. Applied Mathematics and Computation 148 (1), 235–247.
Joshi, H. R., S. Lenhart, M. Y. Li, and L. Wang (2006). Optimal control methods
applied to disease models. Contemporary Mathematics 410, 187–208.
Kanik, Z. and S. Kucuksenel (2013). Implementation of the maximum sustainable
yield under an age-structured model. Technical report, ERC-Economic Research
Center, Middle East Technical University.
Kennish, M. J. and R. E. Loveland (1980). Growth modles of the northern quahog
Mercenaria mercenaria. In Proceedings of the National Shellfisheries Associa-
tion, Volume 70, pp. 230–239.
Langeland, K. A. (1996). Hydrilla verticillata (lf) royle (hydrocharitaceae),” the
perfect aquatic weed”. Castanea, 293–304.
Lenhart, S. M. and J. T. Workman (2007). Optimal control applied to biological
models, Volume 15. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Liu, S., L. Chen, and R. Agarwal (2002). Recent progress on stage-structured
130
population dynamics. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 36 (11), 1319–
1360.
Ludwig, D. and C. J. Walters (1982). Optimal harvesting with imprecise parameter
estimates. Ecological Modelling 14 (3), 273–292.
Marr, J. C. et al. (1944). Age, length and weight studies of three species of columbia
river salmon (oncorhynchus keta, o. gorbuscha and o. kisutch). Technical report,
Salem, Or.: Department of Research, Fish Commission of the State of Oregon.
MATLAB (2010). version 7.10.0 (R2010a). Natick, Massachusetts: The Math-
Works Inc.
Mayo, J. H., T. J. Straka, and D. S. Leonard (2003). The cost of slowing the
spread of the gypsy moth (lepidoptera: Lymantriidae). Journal of Economic
Entomology 96 (5), 1448–1454.
McKay, M. D., R. J. Beckman, and W. J. Conover (1979). Comparison of three
methods for selecting values of input variables in the analysis of output from a
computer code. Technometrics 21 (2), 239–245.
Mehta, S. V., R. G. Haight, F. R. Homans, S. Polasky, and R. C. Venette (2007).
Optimal detection and control strategies for invasive species management. Eco-
logical Economics 61 (2), 237–245.
Mendelssohn, R. (1978). Optimal harvesting strategies for stochastic single-species,
multiage class models. Mathematical Biosciences 41 (3), 159–174.
Moore, C. T. and M. J. Conroy (2006). Optimal regeneration planning for old-
growth forest: addressing scientific uncertainty in endangered species recovery
through adaptive management. Forest Science 52 (2), 155–172.
131
National Invasive Species Council (2008). 2008-2012 National Invasive Species
Management Plan. Washington, DC: Department of the Interior.
Nichols, J. D., F. A. Johnson, B. K. Williams, and G. S. Boomer (2015). On
formally integrating science and policy: walking the walk. Journal of Applied
Ecology .
Nickelson, T. E. and P. W. Lawson (1998). Population viability of coho salmon,
oncorhynchus kisutch, in oregon coastal basins: application of a habitat-based
life cycle model. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 55 (11),
2383–2392.
Nostbakken, L. and T. Bjorndal (2003). Supply functions for north sea herring.
Marine Resource Economics 18 (4).
Pimentel, D., R. Zuniga, and D. Morrison (2005). Update on the environmental
and economic costs associated with alien-invasive species in the united states.
Ecological Economics 52 (3), 273–288.
Pontryagin, L. S. (1987). Mathematical theory of optimal processes. CRC Press.
Possingham, H., S. Andelman, B. Noon, S. Trombulak, and H. Pulliam (2001).
Making smart conservation decisions. Conservation biology: research priorities
for the next decade, 225–244.
Quaas, M. F., T. Requate, K. Ruckes, A. Skonhoft, N. Vestergaard, and R. Voss
(2013). Incentives for optimal management of age-structured fish populations.
Resource and Energy Economics 35 (2), 113–134.
R Development Core Team (2008). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical
Computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
132
Reddy, S. M., A. Wentz, O. Aburto-Oropeza, M. Maxey, S. Nagavarapu, and H. M.
Leslie (2013). Evidence of market-driven size-selective fishing and the mediating
effects of biological and institutional factors. Ecological Applications 23 (4), 726–
741.
Redman, A. M. and J. M. Scriber (2000). Competition between the gypsy moth,
lymantria dispar, and the northern tiger swallowtail, papilio canadensis: inter-
actions mediated by host plant chemistry, pathogens, and parasitoids. Oecolo-
gia 125 (2), 218–228.
Reed, W. J. (1974). A stochastic model for the economic management of a renew-
able animal resource. Mathematical Biosciences 22 (0), 313 – 337.
Reed, W. J. (1979). Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic
harvesting models. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 6 (4),
350 – 363.
Reed, W. J. (1980). Optimum age-specific harvesting in a nonlinear population
model. Biometrics 36 (4), pp. 579–593.
Rorres, C. and W. Fair (1975). Optimal harvesting policy for an age-specific
population. Mathematical Biosciences 24 (1-2), 31 – 47.
Rout, T. M., J. L. Moore, and M. A. McCarthy (2014). Prevent, search or destroy?
a partially observable model for invasive species management. Journal of Applied
Ecology 51 (3), 804–813.
Sainsbury, K. (1988). The ecological basis of multispecies fisheries, and manage-
ment of a demersal fishery in tropical australia. Fish population dynamics 2,
349–382.
133
Sharov, A. A. and A. M. Liebhold (1998). Model of slowing the spread of gypsy
moth (lepidoptera: Lymantriidae) with a barrier zone. Ecological Applica-
tions 8 (4), 1170–1179.
Skonhoft, A. and P. Gong (2014). Wild salmon fishing: Harvesting the old or
young? Resource and Energy Economics 36 (2), 417–435.
Skonhoft, A., N. Vestergaard, and M. Quaas (2012). Optimal harvest in an age
structured model with different fishing selectivity. Environmental and Resource
Economics 51 (4), 525–544.
Stankey, G. H., R. N. Clark, and B. T. Bormann (2005). Adaptive management
of natural resources: theory, concepts, and management institutions.
Swain, D. P., I. D. Jonsen, J. E. Simon, and R. A. Myers (2009). Assessing threats
to species at risk using stage-structured state-space models: mortality trends in
skate populations. Ecological Applications 19 (5), 1347–1364.
Tahvonen, O. (2008). Harvesting an age-structured population as biomass: Does
it work? Natural Resource Modeling 21 (4), 525–550.
Tahvonen, O. (2009). Economics of harvesting age-structured fish populations.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58 (3), 281 – 299.
Tahvonen, O. (2014). Optimal harvesting of size-structured biological populations.
In Dynamic Optimization in Environmental Economics, pp. 329–355. Springer.
Tahvonen, O., M. F. Quaas, J. O. Schmidt, and R. Voss (2013). Optimal harvest-
ing of an age-structured schooling fishery. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 54 (1), 21–39.
134
Thurber, D. K., W. R. McClain, and R. C. Whitmore (1994). Indirect effects of
gypsy moth defoliation on nest predation. The Journal of Wildlife Management ,
493–500.
Walters, C. (1986). Adaptive management of renewable resources. MacMillan Pub.
Co., New York, NY.
Walters, C. J. (1981). Optimum escapements in the face of alternative recruitment
hypotheses. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 38 (6), 678–
689.
Welling, L. and L. Thomson (2003). PHP and MySQL Web development. Sams
Publishing.
Williams, B. K. (2001). Uncertainty, learning, and the optimal management of
wildlife. Environmental and Ecological Statistics 8 (3), 269–288.
Worden, L., L. W. Botsford, A. Hastings, and M. D. Holland (2010). Frequency re-
sponses of age-structured populations: Pacific salmon as an example. Theoretical
population biology 78 (4), 239–249.
135
